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ABSTRACT 
 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) broke apart violently in the 
early 1990s. This thesis explores evidence about the root causes of Yugoslavia’s 
turbulent disintegration. It evaluates the cogency of the most prominent suggested causes 
of the SFRY’s breakup, and draws conclusions regarding the most convincing 
explanations. The most frequently discussed potential causes of the breakup include 
nationalism, international politics, economic competition, contention among the 
Yugoslav political elites, and “ancient hatreds.” From the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 
until the combat began in 1991, there was constant tension between the different 
ethnicities, and the fiercest disputes were between the Serbs and the Croats. The thesis 
concludes that none of the proposed causes alone can provide an explanation for the 
SFRY’s dissolution, which involved the interaction of multiple factors. However, the 
self-interested republic-level Yugoslav political elites, backed by certain foreign 
countries, constituted the decisive factor in the Yugoslav federation’s collapse. 
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The breakup of Yugoslavia happened simultaneously with the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The era of communist society was coming to an end in Europe. Western powers 
sought to democratize the world. Socialist Yugoslavia could not remain untouched by 
developments in the Soviet empire. The only way to preserve the country was through a 
smooth transition to democracy. There was no powerful leader, such as Josip Broz Tito 
(the ruler of Yugoslavia from 1945 to 1980), who could reach out to all parts of Yugoslavia 
and unite the country in this transformation. Why were the Yugoslav republics unable to 
find a peaceful solution for transformation from socialism to a democratic government? 
Over the course of the existence of Yugoslavia nationalism emerged regularly, and the 
republics were unable to find unity beyond Tito’s charismatic leadership. After his death 
in 1980, unity was unattainable, and discord led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, followed 
by an extremely violent civil war with crimes against humanity.  
The saga of the breakup of Yugoslavia has become an important case study in the 
evaluation of fragility in the unity of a nation. Thus, an examination of the contributing 
factors that led to the demise of Yugoslavia may help guide analysis of the strength of 
cohesion in a union. By investigating what led to the creation of the Yugoslavian state after 
World War I, the emergence of the communist party leader Josip Broz Tito, the victorious 
outcome of World War II, and post-World War II international relationships, and how these 
events have affected the rise and fall of Yugoslavia, this thesis sheds some light on the 
possible underlying causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The history of the Yugoslav 
republics will also be a factor to consider as a reason for the break up. This thesis analyses 
the weakness in Yugoslav unity looking through the lenses of nationalism and economics. 
Furthermore, it assesses the motives of the Yugoslav political elites and foreign powers as 
factors in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In examining the ways in which nationalism, 
economics, the Yugoslav political elites, and the international political environment 
influenced unity in Yugoslavia, this thesis attempts to contribute to the larger body of work 
that studies the foundations of national unity in federations. 
2 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the causes of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. This country, which once defied Soviet’s governing 
system under Joseph Stalin, former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, and established its own communist path, broke apart in a messy and complex civil 
war. The Croats and the Slovenes developed their economy more quickly than the rest of 
Yugoslav republics, and they were the first to secede from Yugoslavia. The Serbs tried to 
maintain the country’s unity. Once it was clear that there was no future for a united 
Yugoslavia, the Serbs supported the Serb factions in Croatia and Bosnia in an attempt to 
maintain control and expand Serbia’s borders. 
The primary question the thesis address is the following: What were the reasons for 
the country’s violent breakup in 1990s? Additionally, this thesis investigates how 
Yugoslavia developed from its formation in 1918 to its breakup with the end of the Bosnian 
conflict in 1995.1 To what extent were economic factors significant? To what extent were 
contending political identities decisive? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The United States projects its political influence worldwide in order to protect and 
advance its national interests. Historically, multiple events in the Balkans have been 
connected to major shifts in the international order. Hence, it is in the United States national 
interest to maintain its influence in the Balkans. In order to do so it is necessary to 
understand the values, principles, and attitudes of the fairly new independent countries that 
emerged from the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
Over twenty years have passed since the Dayton Peace Agreement brought an end to the 
ethnic war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the former Yugoslav republics faced 
turmoil from the war that changed them forever. The newly developed condition in the 
region with respect to the consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia is worth 
investigating because it left deep wounds, which will not heal in the near term. The events 
                                                 
1 Various other end dates for analysis are sometimes employed by scholars. One could, for example, 
regard the Kosovo War in 1998-1999 or the independence of Montenegro in 2006 as end dates. 
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during the Yugoslav civil war will continue to affect the prospects for cooperation between 
the nations in the region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The collapse of Yugoslavia can be attributed to many factors. However, this thesis 
will focus on examining arguments based on nationalism, economic factors, the role of 
Yugoslav political elites, international politics, and “ancient hatreds.” With the exception 
of the last argument, all of these approaches are supported by strong evidence. However, 
the collapse was a complex process that cannot be credited to a single factor. Thus, an 
examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments may help to clarify the 
causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. 
1. Ancient Hatreds Argument 
During the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s, the supposedly ancient hatreds among 
the ethnicities composing the Yugoslav population stood out in prominent journalistic 
accounts as a predominant argument for the cause of the civil war. Robert Kaplan, for 
example, claimed that the Balkan nations have always engaged in fratricidal wars: “Here 
men have been isolated by poverty and ethnic rivalry, dooming them to hate. Here politics 
has been reduced to a level of a near anarchy that from time to time in history has flowed 
up the Danube into Central Europe.” Kaplan goes on to say that “Nazism, for instance, can 
claim Balkan origins. Among the flophouses in Vienna, a breeding ground of ethnic 
resentments close to the southern Slavic world, Hitler learned how to hate so infectiously.”2 
According to Patrick Bishop, “Folk memories are long, and inability to forget the hatreds 
of the past has condemned successive generations to perpetuate them.”3 
In an interview with The Sunday Times in 1999, Bill Clinton, who was then the 
United States President, stated that Yugoslavia under the communist regime, which 
                                                 
2 Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: Picador, 2005), li. 
3 Patrick Bishop, Daily Telegraph, January 20, 1999, quoted in Dejan Jovic, Yugoslavia: A State that 
Withered Away (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009), 40. 
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suppressed the long-standing ethnic tensions, had a “false stability.”4 Moreover, President 
Clinton adopted Kaplan’s thesis to justify non-intervention in Bosnia. In her book On the 
Edge, Elizabeth Drew, a political journalist and author, recounts how President Clinton 
after reading Kaplan’s book had a discussion with Les Aspin, then the Secretary of 
Defense, about the deep historical roots of conflict in Bosnia. The discussion prompted 
Aspin to call members of the National Security Council’s Principal Committee and warn 
them that Clinton would not support military actions in Bosnia.5 Additionally, the idea of 
ancient hatreds was supported by the British Prime Minister John Major.6   
Misha Glenny has admitted that in his earlier works he had supported the ancient 
hatreds argument. However, after much criticism Glenny revised his view on Balkan 
history and published newer studies in which he opposed this argument.7 While there is 
not much scholarly literature to support the “ancient hatreds” theory, much of the 
worldwide popular view has been based on this argument owing to the media coverage of 
the war. 
The major Yugoslav ethnicities are Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, 
Bosniaks, Albanians, and Macedonians. The additional ethnicities present, such as 
Magyars, Turks, Vlach and others, accounted for a negligible proportion of the population 
and will be excluded from this analysis of the ancient hatreds theory. Furthermore, because 
civil war did not erupt in Macedonia and only lasted for ten days in Slovenia, these two 
countries will also not be taken into consideration for an assessment of the ancient hatreds 
argument. The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo likewise did not play a role in the early 1990s 
war, but took center stage in 1998–1999 Kosovo War. Therefore, the argument for ancient 
hatreds concentrates on the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniaks. The argument for ancient 
hatreds between these three ethnicities is weak because history does not show a major 
                                                 
4 “Clinton Says NATO Could Not Let History Forget Kosovo Albanians,” CNN, April 18, 1999, 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/04/18/clinton.letter/. 
5 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 157. 
6 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York: 
Viking, 2000), xxiv. 
7 Glenny, xxv. 
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conflict between them. The territory of Yugoslavia, populated by the South Slavs in the 
6th century, was mostly under occupation until the early 19th century by the Ottoman and 
Hapsburg Empires. If there were an ancient hatred, it would have been directed to the 
occupiers, not the indigenous populations. 
The culture of the three main ethnicities differs in regard to their religion. Serbs are 
Orthodox, Croats are Catholic, and Bosniaks are Muslim. Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a 
population comprised of all three ethnicities, prior to the civil war had abundant mixed 
marriages. The people in Bosnia lived together as neighbors without any significant inter-
ethnic disputes. Furthermore, the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian languages are almost 
identical. The common language further adds to the similarities of the three ethnicities.8 
The key event that supports the argument for the existence of ancient hatreds is 
World War II. The Nazis, after they occupied the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, formed a puppet 
state known as the Independent State of Croatia led by an extremist political movement 
called Ustaše. During World War II the Ustaše regime, led by Ante Pavelić, burnt villages 
and killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs with extreme brutality. Furthermore, the Ustaše 
set up multiple concentration camps that made additional hundreds of thousands of Serbs 
victims of the genocidal policy of the notorious regime.9 While the cruelty and the mass 
killings by the Ustaše could have provoked ethnic hatreds during World War II, there was 
no reciprocity on that magnitude by the Serb and Muslim extremist groups. The Serb 
extremist groups, called Četniks, killed around fifty thousand Muslims and Croats.10 The 
Četniks, in contrast with the Ustaše, were an anti-Axis movement and represented the 
exiled Yugoslav monarchy in London. The methods that the Ustaše used show that they 
followed Nazi directives in exterminating Jews and Slavs, but the Ustaše did not represent 
                                                 
8 Fedja Buric, “Confessions of a ‘Mixed Marriage Child’. Diary in the Study of Yugoslavia’s 
Breakup,” Südosteuropa 64, no. 3 (January 1, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2016-0028. 
9 Rory Yeomans, Visions of Annihilation the Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 
1941-1945 (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013), 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10904631. 
10 Vladimir Geiger, “Human Losses of The Croats In World War II and The Immediate Post-War 
Period Caused by The Chetniks (Yugoslav Army in The Fatherland) and The Partisans (People’s Liberation 
Army and The Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia/ Yugoslav Army) and The Yugoslav Communist 
Authorities Numerical Indicators,” no. 1 (March 12, 2012): 45. 
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the majority of the Croatian population. The lack of solid historical evidence makes the 
ancient ethnic hatreds argument weak. However, it is worth critically examining because 
propaganda highlighting ethnic hatreds was used by the local leaders of specific ethnicities 
to gain support from the masses. 
2. Economic Argument 
The economic argument is based on Yugoslavia’s continuous economic struggle 
after World War II, notably in late 1970s and early 1980s. Susan Woodward, an advocate 
of the economic argument, holds that the cause of the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s 
resided in issues of economic insecurity, and individual and family instability stemmed 
from adjustments to the global economy.11 Patricia Taylor, Grendjean Burk, and Niko Tos 
maintain that the core of the Yugoslav economic system was the self-management of the 
enterprises.12 According to Jasminka Udovički, the leading Yugoslav economists, 
Alexander Bajt and Branko Horvat, emphasized that Slovenia achieved its economic 
growth under that system.13 However, the Yugoslav system’s performance was far behind 
that of the capitalist countries in Europe. Dinko Dubravčić argues that the inequality among 
the republics in economic contributions to Yugoslavia’s federal budget added to the 
disputes.14 Slovenia and Croatia, the leading contributors to the Yugoslav federal budget, 
were pushing for economic autonomy from Yugoslavia. David Binder identifies the 
implications of the United States passing the Foreign Operations Appropriation law in 
1990. The law limited the United States in issuing loans or credits only to a republic “which 
                                                 
11 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C: 
Brookings Institution, 1995), 228. 
12 Patricia Taylor, Grendjean Burke, and Niko Tos, “Work Satisfaction Under Yugoslav Self-
Management: On Participation, Authority, and Ownership,” Social Forces 65, no. 4 (June 1, 1987): 16. 
13 Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway, eds., Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of 
Yugoslavia (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1997), 286. 
14 Dinko Dubravčić, “Economic Causes and Political Context of the Dissolution of a Multinational 
Federal State: The Case of Yugoslavia,” Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 5, no. 3 
(January 1993): 259–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/14631379308427758. 
7 
has held free and fair elections and which is not engaged in systematic abuse of human 
rights.”15 This law would further push the republics to seek independence from Belgrade. 
Following the dispute with the Soviets in 1948, Yugoslavia faced isolation. The 
Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito, did not have alternative options and had to seek help 
from the West. He applied to the World Bank in 1949 and started to receive funding from 
the West. Furthermore, the economic system was weak and was unable to produce growth. 
The central government had to implement a creative reform to produce economic 
growth within a socialist framework in order to preserve its ideology. The result was the 
introduction in June 1950 of the basic law of workers’ self-management, whereby in theory 
enterprises belonged to the workers. Yugoslav economists led by Edward Kardelj—a 
Slovenian politician, and second in command in the Yugoslavian leadership hierarchy—
developed the self-managing system of the enterprises. It was a hybrid of capitalistic and 
socialist systems that limited the communist government in interfering with the 
management and gave more freedom to the managers in running the enterprises. It was 
considered to be the most effective use of the capitalist gains to increase productivity and 
create products for domestic and foreign markets. Yugoslav socialism combined capitalist 
and socialist ideals and policies, and it was open to the world economy. Woodward notes 
that the foundation of the Yugoslav governing system was constructed on the balancing act 
between East and West. Yugoslavia’s military independence from Moscow gave them a 
huge leverage when bargaining with the West. She states that Yugoslavia played “a critical 
role in defence of NATO’s southern flank against possible Soviet movement west.”16 For 
Yugoslavia’s neutrality the West provided economic assistance, membership in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank loans, and association with the European 
Commission (EC) the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the General 
                                                 
15 David Binder, “Evolution in Europe; Yugoslavia Seen Breaking up Soon,” The New York Times, 
November 28, 1990, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1990/11/28/world/evolution-in-europe-
yugoslavia-seen-breaking-up-soon.html. 
16 Susan L Woodward, “The Political Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia,” in Fighting 
Identities: Race, Religion, and Nationalism, ed. Leo Panitch and Colin Leys, vol. 39, Socialist Register 
2003 (London: Merlin Press, 2003), 75. 
8 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).17 However, after the Cold War, without the 
economic assistance from the West, Yugoslavia was not able to keep up with the world 
market trends, and this eventually led to recession, inflation, and the collapse of the whole 
economic system.18 
Economic crises emerged in Yugoslavia after the 1974 constitution transferred 
considerable power to the republics. It allowed the republics to act freely in pursuit of their 
interests and empowered them to manage their internal economies. In the 1970s the West 
provided abundant low interest credit to Yugoslavia. As a result, foreign debt increased 
300 percent by 1980, from six billion dollars in 1975 to nineteen billion dollars in 1980. 
Funds were mismanaged and misinvested to satisfy political rather than economic 
objectives. Thus, interest on foreign debt brought Yugoslavia three-digit inflation. The 
economic crises culminated in 1987 with strikes for higher pay and lower prices for basic 
products.19 
After the Cold War, the foreign powers’ priorities shifted to providing economic 
assistance to the Central European states. Yugoslavia lost the strategic importance it 
possessed during the Cold War, and the IMF’s economic assistance was conditioned with 
a push for a democratic system of governance. The West viewed Yugoslavia as simply 
another local government, which, if it fell behind, provoked little interest from outside 
authorities capable of intervention.20 The economic crises widened the gaps between the 
republics. Citizens in Slovenia judged that they would be better off economically if they 
split from Yugoslavia. Even the citizens of Kosovo, on the other side of the spectrum, 
believed the same since its GDP per capita was falling.21 
                                                 
17 Woodward, “The Political Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia.” 
18 Dražen Marjanac, “Economic Aspects of Breakup of Yugoslavia,” Зборник Радова Економског 
Факултета y Источном Сарајеву 1, no. 11 (May 4, 2016): 83, 
https://doi.org/10.7251/ZREFIS1511083M. 
19 Udovički and Ridgeway, Burn This House, 81. 
20 Woodward, “The Political Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia.” 
21 Dejan Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: A Critical Review of Explanatory Approaches,” 
European Journal of Social Theory 4, no. 1 (2001): 101–120, https://doi.org/10.1177/13684310122225037. 
9 
During the economic crises Ante Marković, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, 
emerged as its most popular politician, with solid economic reforms. Marković advocated 
for a substantial degree of privatization and a fully market-oriented economy. Woodward 
implies that, his economic reforms were based on an assumption that the West would 
provide economic assistance for Yugoslavia “to pay the interest on the foreign debt.”22 
However, the leaders of the most powerful Yugoslav republics—Slovenia, Croatia and 
Serbia—declined economic support from the European Community by not accepting a 
political compromise.23 Therefore, despite the promising economic reforms and popularity 
of Ante Marković, the West did not loan funds to Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and instead 
focused on providing assistance to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
The economic crises preceding the Yugoslav Civil War provide a plausible 
argument as a factor in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. However, the economy alone cannot 
provide an explanation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia because it does not take into 
consideration the human aspect. The end of the Cold War should have helped Yugoslavia 
to come out of its financial crises due to the reduced military expenditure. Moreover, 
Yugoslavia collapsed while the reforms of Ante Marković demonstrated an economic 
progression. Until the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 Yugoslavia was economically 
the most advanced case of all the East European Communist societies, and had the greatest 
political autonomy in relation to Moscow with the possible exception of Albania from 1968 
to 1991. 
3. Nationalism Argument 
Nationalism was present in Yugoslavia from the beginning of the kingdom in 1918. 
Aleksa Djilas, an historian and political commentator, observes that after the fall of 
Communism in 1991, nationalism was the main alternative political creed.24 Democratic 
currents, economic crises, and a leadership vacuum threatened the conservative wing. The 
                                                 
22 Woodward, “The Political Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia.” 
23 Jovic, “The Disintegration of Yugoslavia.” 
24 Aleksa Djilas, Raspad i Nada: Eseji, Članci i Intervjui, 1991-1994, Edicija Cogito (Beograd: 
Princip, 1995). 
10 
way out was nationalism. Dejan Jovic’s study is exceptionally enlightening because he 
points out the lack of political institutions that represented the citizens of Yugoslavia. 
During Tito’s regime, nationalism was banned, but it was strong in underground 
movements. The Yugoslavian regime failed to establish political institutions that would 
represent the Yugoslav people as one nationality.25 
Susan Woodward’s explanation for nationalism is based on the federation’s weak 
economy. The nationalistic rhetoric appealed to the people without government jobs. As 
the economy decayed, nationalism gained support.26 Jasminka Udovički’s analysis shows 
that Yugoslavia’s leadership struggled to eliminate nationalism after the country’s creation 
in 1918. The Yugoslav king divided the country into nine provinces in an effort to remove 
the traditional borders and break nationalism.27 Tito abolished Serb and Croat nationalist 
movements by force. However, nationalism prevailed and was an effective instrument for 
blocking progressive social and political change in Yugoslavia.28 Of the relevant studies, 
the article by Jovic is especially valuable because its analysis shows that the failures of the 
efforts to create a single Yugoslav nationality were reflected in the country’s institutions. 
While the ancient hatreds argument does not help to explain Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration, nationalism is the most debated scholarly argument with a convincing basis. 
The former Yugoslav Republics had historical, economic and cultural differences that 
contributed to the strong nationalism that culminated in the 1990s. Each Yugoslav republic 
has a rich and extensive history dating back for centuries. The Croats and the Slovenes 
were under the rule of the Hapsburg Empire from the 12th century until the creation of the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. During the same period the Serbs, the 
Montenegrins, the Macedonians, and the Bosniaks were under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire. Under foreign domination, the republics developed different histories that divided 
them. 
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Strong nationalism among the Serb population was evident from the beginning of 
the unification in 1918. First, Serbia was the only republic of the kingdom that was 
independent, governed with a fusion of monarchy and parliamentary democracy, prior to 
the unification. Therefore, the Yugoslav king was a Serb from the dynasty of Karađorđe. 
King Alexander dissolved the Parliament in 1929 and ruled Yugoslavia in a highly 
centralized and authoritarian regime. The Serb leaders reigned over this country as a Great 
Serbia, not as Yugoslavia. Second, the Serbs generally believed that they paid a 
disproportionately higher price for freedom than the rest of the Yugoslav nations and did 
not receive proper recognition for their sacrifices in the Balkan wars, World War I and 
World War II.29 Serbs accounted for forty percent of the Yugoslav population, but Tito 
denied them a role in the government proportionate to their numbers. 
On the other hand, the Croats continuously fought for greater autonomy throughout 
Yugoslavia’s existence. Following the unification in 1918, the Croats wanted a new federal 
constitution linking the Serbs and the Croats. Croat leaders accepted the monarchy but 
insisted on federalization and democratization.30 They struggled from 1919 on to form a 
party in the parliament. As documented in the Zagreb Manifesto of 1932, the Croats, the 
Slovenes, and the inhabitants of Vojvodina and Bosnia and Herzegovina sought greater 
autonomy. The authoritarian government led by King Alexander responded by imprisoning 
the leaders who signed this manifesto. 
The Serbs dominated Yugoslavia until the Germans invaded the country in April 
1941. The monarchy led by King Peter II, the successor of King Alexander, went into exile 
in London. This created a political vacuum which Tito’s Communist Party was able to 
exploit. His principal opponent, the main challenger to his supremacy as the ultimate 
Yugoslav leader, was Dragoljub Mihailović, the leader of a Serbian faction called the 
Četniks, who represented the exiled monarchy. Tito was a Croat. He was nonetheless able 
to recruit supporters throughout Yugoslavia with a strong anti-nationalistic focus. He 
argued for brotherhood and unity among the Yugoslav ethnic groups to win Yugoslavia’s 
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independence. In contrast, Mihailović was only able to obtain support from the Serbs. Tito 
was widely supported in Yugoslavia, with the exception of Serbia. Nationalism was a 
hurdle that the Yugoslav Communist Party had to overcome to unite Yugoslavia. 
Subsequently, after World War II King Peter was not allowed to return to Yugoslavia, and 
Mihailović was tried and executed for treason and war crimes. The Communist Party also 
faced a threat of nationalism from the Croatian Catholic Church, led by Archbishop 
Aloysius Stepinac, who was tried and sentenced to sixteen years in prison.31 Tito’s 
charismatic leadership held the unity of Yugoslavia, but frequently he had to combat 
nationalists in Serbia and Croatia. 
In the late 1960s, a cultural and political movement, the Croatian Spring, emerged 
from the Communist Party in Croatia. A younger generation of Croat politicians tried to 
overcome the Communist Party. Croats sought reforms for more rights for the Republic of 
Croatia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1970, Croat ideologists 
formed the institution Matica Hrvatska, which was intended to expand access to the 
Croatian culture. At that time, the Serbo-Croatian language was the official language of the 
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. There are no major differences between the Serbian and the 
Croatian languages, except that Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet and the Croats use the Latin. 
In 1967, Croat scholars wrote a document, Declaration of the Status and Name of the 
Croatian Language, and published it in a Yugoslavian newspaper, seeking recognition of 
Croatian as an independent language. In 1971 Tito’s patience diminished, and the 
movement was abolished by force. He influenced the decision of the major Croat political 
figures to resign, ousted most members of the Croat communist party, and legally 
prosecuted thousands of people. One of the arrested was Franjo Tuđman, a future president 
of Croatia, who led Croatia throughout the breakup of Yugoslavia. The 1971 movement in 
Croatia was crushed, but the new federal constitution that was ratified in 1974 satisfied 
some of the demands of the Croatian Spring movement. The Croats were not alone in 
seeking greater autonomy within Yugoslavia. As early as the 1970s the Slovenes were 
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more interested in cultivating links with Austria and West Germany than in keeping their 
relationships with the Yugoslav republics. 
The economic struggles and disagreements among the Yugoslav republics 
increased the rise of nationalism. Slovenes and Croats viewed the rest of the republics as 
more primitive. The economies of these two republics were significantly superior to the 
rest. Croatia and Slovenia, accounting for the greatest economic contributions in 
Yugoslavia, showed discontent in funding the less developed Yugoslav republics.32 
Divisions in the Communist Party also emerged, creating conservative and liberal sides. 
Conservatives were citizens of the less developed republics who pushed for equality in the 
distribution of funds among the republics, wage equality on a national level, and 
consequently a greater central authority. The liberal communists who lived in the more 
developed republics supported Western principles such as self-management and limited 
government interference with the management of the enterprises. 
Nationalism is an important factor among the arguments purporting to explain the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, Jovic claims that “what the nationalist argument 
fails to explain is the growing sense of Yugoslavism among the population” from 1970 to 
1990.33 Furthermore, the Communist Party was aware of the nationalism but made no 
attempt to create an artificial unity. The Communists believed that the development of a 
unified Yugoslavia could be only achieved by creating a common interest. The people of 
Yugoslavia were encouraged to develop relationships with each other. Eventually, the 
younger population started to develop a Yugoslav culture.  
4. The Role of the Yugoslav Political Elites Argument 
Vladimir Goati argues that political elites were the reason for Yugoslavia’s 
collapse. In 1989–1991, after the collapse of communism, Yugoslavia encountered major 
challenges in implementing political and economic changes. Goati holds that the 
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devastating conflicts within the Yugoslav elite were decisive and led to the breakup.34 
Warren Zimmermann, the last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, observes in his 
memoirs that the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia had distinct personalities and 
ideologies.35 Despite their differences, all three of them had the same 
agenda—-maximizing their power. Franjo Tuđman in his book Horrors of War further 
expounded his nationalistic ideology and assessed the nature and scope of the crimes 
committed by the Ustaše. Although he condemned the atrocities they committed during 
World War II, he argued that they had been exaggerated. Furthermore, he asserted, the war 
crimes were no greater than those of the Serbian counterparts, the Četniks.36  
Tito exercised power in Yugoslavia above the law. He did not represent any 
particular ethnic group, but he had his own vision for the future of Yugoslavia. The 1974 
constitution gave the republics greater autonomy, and at the same time declared Tito as 
President without limitation of office.37 His power was sufficient to successfully act as an 
arbitrator in any emerging ethnic conflicts. However, after Tito’s death, the constitution 
weakened the power of the central government. Tito’s ideological and political leadership 
of Yugoslavia was replaced by leaders who represented the republics, and formed a body 
called the Yugoslav State Council, also known as the Yugoslav Council of the Presidency. 
The Council was led by a president who served a one-year term, and the presidency rotated 
between the representatives of the six republics and the two provinces. With the Yugoslav 
State Council’s powers diminished, its representatives conveyed the messages of the 
presidents of the republics. The presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia had a significant 
influence in the Yugoslav State Council, but were able to gain support only from their 
segments of society. 
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The last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, in his memoirs 
portrayed the personalities and ideologies of the presidents of three republics as distinctive, 
although all of them championed nationalist ideas. Serbian president Slobodan Milošević 
was an opportunist, not an ideologist. Milošević disturbed the balance created after Tito’s 
death. He was driven by a thirst for power, not nationalism. He used nationalism only to 
gain support from the Serb population. Milošević rallied supporters by campaigning with 
a strong nationalistic message: “all Serbs have the right to live in a single state.” He was 
interested in a united Yugoslavia controlled by Serbs. Milošević’s vision of unity was not 
democratic. He strived for a superior political power within Yugoslavia over the other 
republics. According to Zimmermann, Milošević had an extremely cold personality and 
did not care about human suffering.38 
In contrast to Milošević, the Croat President, Franjo Tuđman, was obsessed with 
nationalism. He ran an extremely nationalistic campaign that caused Ambassador 
Zimmermann to avoid interactions with him until he won the election. Tuđman during his 
campaign made statements such as that he was “glad his wife was neither a Serb nor a 
Jew.”39 He used these statements to associate himself with the notorious Ustaše from 
World War II. According to Udovički, Tuđman published a book in 1989, Wilderness, in 
which he expressed strong nationalist ideas and claimed that reports of Ustaše war crimes 
in World War II had been exaggerated.40 Zimmermann alleges that what made Tuđman 
different from Milošević “is that he really [wanted] to be a Western statesman.”41  
Slovenian President Milan Kučan simply wanted to cut ties with Yugoslavia. He 
declared independence without negotiating for a legal secession, an approach that exposed 
his profound selfishness by ignoring the other twenty-two million Yugoslavs.42 Slovenia 
owed its economic growth to the system of self-management established under Tito. 
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Kučan’s actions instigated the civil war in Yugoslavia. The Slovenes were fortunate in that 
they were the most homogeneous nation in the union. 
The argument highlighting the influence of Yugoslav political elites has a solid case 
as a factor in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the middle of the 1990s, public opinion polls 
showed that seventy percent of the population were in favor of Yugoslavian unity. The 
different personalities of the Yugoslav political elites made unity and democracy 
impossible in Yugoslavia. After Tito’s death the structure of the Yugoslav political 
institutions did not allow for a strong central government. The republics developed greater 
autonomy, which widened the political gap between them. The political elites that emerged 
in the republics won elections based on nationalistic campaigns. Therefore, none of them 
was able to gain nationwide support. For Yugoslavia to have remained united, they would 
have had to transfer power in the republics to centralist leaders with strong support and 
popularity among the entire Yugoslav population. Prime Minister Ante Marković was one 
of those leaders who, despite the positive results of his reforms, could not get support from 
the leaders of the republics. Marković lost the battle for unity after he agreed to republican 
referenda followed by a federal referendum. Once the leaders of the republics gained power 
from the local referenda, they were not willing to give it up. Consequently, the federal 
referendum was never held. However, this argument fails to explain why the leaders of 
Slovenia and Serbia gained support from the European Community countries and other 
Western states. Secession without such international support would have been impossible. 
5. International Politics Argument 
Susan Woodward argued that, in addition to economic factors, Yugoslavia 
collapsed because of the disruption in the international order caused by the collapse of 
communism in Europe. Yugoslavia’s stability had become dependent on the international 
economic environment. However, changes in the economic policies of the Western nations 
on which Yugoslavia depended caused its dissolution.43 Veljko Kadijevic, the top general 
of the Yugoslav People’s Army, added that the collapse of the USSR increased pressure 
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from the West on Slovenia and Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia.44 James Gow examined 
how and why Britain, France, Germany, and the United States failed to manage the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. He concluded that the fundamental reasons for this failure were 
“bad timing, poor judgment, a lack of cohesion, and absence of will to implement policies” 
on the part of the leading Western nations.45 
The international politics argument holds that the collapse of Yugoslavia occurring 
simultaneously with the end of the Cold War was not a coincidence. During the Cold War 
Yugoslavia played an important role in international politics. Defiant against the USSR, 
determined to preserve and pursue its own model of Communism, Yugoslavia drew support 
from the United States and other Western nations. Throughout the Cold War, the threat of 
a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia caused concern for the Western allies. The strategic 
location of Yugoslavia along the Adriatic Sea was a factor of importance to the NATO 
allies. They supported Yugoslavia in order to prevent the establishment of Soviet military 
bases along the coast. The most important role that Yugoslavia had in the Cold War was 
the development of its own Socialist system and founding the Non-Alignment Movement, 
which irritated the Soviets.46 Some of the communist countries tried to follow the 
Yugoslavian socialist system in order to develop autonomy from the USSR. In the cases in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets were quick to respond with an invasion and the 
removal of the rebellious leadership. Unlike Yugoslavia, the other Eastern European 
communist countries did not have Western support, and the Soviets were able to retain 
control easily. The Yugoslavian Socialist system exposed a weakness in the Soviet 
regime—its coercive system of control of the communist nations. Western allies saw 
Yugoslavian communism as a competitor to the Soviets and continued to support it. With 
the end of the Cold War Yugoslavia lost the strategic importance it had enjoyed, and it was 
no longer able to benefit from the frictions between the East and the West. The United 
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States and other Western allies lost interest in the Balkan Peninsula. The diminished 
influence of external great powers resulted in increased tensions between the republics, 
which were no longer restrained by those powers. After the collapse of the USSR, the 
ethnic groups of Yugoslavia were put in an environment similar to that of the states in the 
anarchic international system. They had to maximize their security and compete for 
survival. With the absence of a threatening hegemon—the Soviet Union—the incentives 
for Yugoslav unity vanished. The security of the individual Yugoslav republics diminished, 
and they needed to defend themselves. 
The international politics argument emphasizes the reasons for the stances that 
foreign countries took regarding the Yugoslav civil war. The United States supported 
Yugoslav unity, because without that unity war was inevitable. However, the United States 
at that time put priority on the conflicts in the Middle East. To the United States, Iraq 
invading Kuwait created greater immediate concerns for its national security than the 
situation in the Balkans. Therefore, Washington left the Balkan conflict in the hands of the 
European Community (EC). After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation was 
unable to project its influence in the Balkans. Hence, the EC was the only institution able 
to intervene effectively until 1995 when the United States and NATO actively engaged in 
the conflict.47  
Some observers thought that a strong Yugoslavia was not in the interest of the EC. 
The Cold War restrained Austria, Germany, and Italy from encouraging Croatia and 
Slovenia to seek independence. After the Cold War, with the United States shifting its 
interest to the Middle East, the policy shifted. Countries of the EC met with the presidents 
of Slovenia and Croatia and provided support for their secession. A week after the U.S. 
Secretary of State, James Baker, met with the leaders of Slovenia and Croatia, and clarified 
the U.S. position regarding unity in Yugoslavia, they declared independence. This action 
implies that Croatia and Slovenia had support from the EC and probably the impression 
that the United States would not interfere with their intention. Despite the fact that they 
were well aware that secession would cause a civil war, Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
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Hungary, and Italy recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia immediately. 
Furthermore, they let it be known that they would recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should this political entity decide to declare independence. The EC countries, after 
disagreeing about how to proceed, recognized the independence of the former Yugoslav 
republics but lacked the will necessary for a military intervention in the conflict, citing the 
ethnic hatreds among the factions as an excuse. However, the international politics 
argument fails to explain the emergence of the ethnic hatreds. These ethnic hatreds 
emerged before 1995, when external powers intervened with military force. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The biggest fallacy concerning the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia is based 
on the hindsight bias—that what happened, had to happen. Yugoslavia’s dissolution was 
widely regarded as an improbable outcome, but since it happened, the common tendency 
has been to think that it was inevitable.48 The literature review considered five hypotheses 
concerning the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia: nationalism, economic factors, the 
role of Yugoslav political elites, international politics, and ancient hatreds among the 
Yugoslav ethnicities. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that some of the potential 
causes were probably more important than others, as indicated in the preliminary overview 
that follows bellow.  
The first potential cause of the dissolution of Yugoslavia may have been strong 
nationalism within the former Yugoslav republics. Nationalism persisted throughout 
Yugoslavia’s existence from 1918 to 1991. The majority of the citizens of Yugoslavia 
identified themselves first as a Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, 
Bosnians or Albanians, and second as Yugoslavs. This thesis examines why the citizens of 
Yugoslavia did not develop an identity based on a common nationality. Moreover, it raises 
a question: if nationalism was so strong among the ethnicities, why did it lead to a civil war 
in the 1990s and not earlier? Therefore, a potential hypothesis is that nationalism existed 
in Yugoslavia (perhaps to a stronger degree in some republics than in others), but it was 
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not strong enough to lead to a dissolution of Yugoslavia. It had to be supplemented by the 
effects of other causes.  
The second potential cause of the dissolution is Yugoslavia’s continuous economic 
struggles that culminated in the 1970s and 1980s. Yugoslavia was a socialist country, with 
an economic system less productive than that of the West. Throughout the post-World War 
II era, Yugoslav leaders struggled to integrate a free market economy with a socialist 
ideology. The system’s overall performance was superior to that of the other communist 
countries in Europe, but far behind that of the capitalists. The strategic importance of 
Yugoslavia during the Cold War generated economic support from the West, which 
compensated for its flawed economic system. Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance after 
the Cold War, and fell behind the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in the priorities of 
the Western countries in providing economic assistance. The thesis assesses whether—and 
to what extent—there was economic rivalry among the former Yugoslav republics before 
and after the breakup of the Yugoslav federation.  
The third potential cause is the quest for power maximization among the Yugoslav 
political elites. Tito established himself as the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia. His 
charismatic leadership sufficed to contain and manage the strong nationalistic currents. 
However, due to his age his power gradually declined. The federal reforms in the 1974 
gave the republics greater governing autonomy. Political leaders from the various 
ethnicities within Yugoslavia sought power, fought for ideologies, supported nationalism, 
and were able to gain strength over the central government. Public opinion within 
Yugoslavia showed that seventy percent of the people were for unity. However, unity 
threatened the political elites who had established themselves in the republics. To gain 
support the political leaders engaged in extreme nationalist campaigns fueled with 
propaganda. The thesis strives to distinguish the roles played by local political elites in 
exploiting other factors, including ideology and economic competition.  
The fourth potential cause is the influence of international politics on Yugoslavia’s 
government. During the period from 1945 to 1991, Yugoslavia increased its military 
strength. The security dilemma—that is, a fear of a strong and united Yugoslavia—may 
have been one of the motives behind the European Community’s decision to support the 
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secession of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia. Austria, Germany, and Italy were 
among the Western nations that succeeded in rearranging the balance of power in Europe 
and enhancing their influence in the Balkans. The thesis examines the relative importance 
of such international political factors.  
The final cause suggested by some commentators is the ancient hatreds between 
the Yugoslav ethnicities. According to certain commentators, ethnic groups in the Balkans 
have engaged in numerous conflicts throughout history; and the recurrent conflicts 
involved brutalities which could not be forgotten. This causation narrative holds that ethnic 
hatreds, reignited by political leaders, escalated to unimaginable cruelties that reached a 
climax with the mass genocides during the Bosnian War. Paramilitary troops from Serbia 
and Croatia spread hatred by conducting genocides. The result was the total destruction of 
the country that Tito built. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II evaluates the nationalist argument. 
Chapter III examines the economic factors. Chapter IV discussed the Yugoslav political 
elites and the interaction with foreign political powers. Chapter V offers conclusions.  
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN 
YUGOSLAVIA  
The integration and disintegration of Yugoslavia are closely tied to the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. It was these three nations that originally formed Yugoslavia, and 
these three nations bear the responsibility for dismantling it. All three ethnicities are 
descendants of the South Slavs who populated the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century. 
Yet, the first time they united under one flag was at the end of World War I. The reasons 
why they could not be united earlier are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, because 
the South Slavs were unable to unify until 1918, they developed different identities. Ivo 
Banac, a Croatian historian, suggests that the national identity of the South Slavs existed 
long time before modern nationalism. They preserved their identity primarily through 
consciousness of the national elites, and part was the popular imagination, despite not 
having a state independence.49 This chapter investigates the roots of the nationalism among 
the South Slavs and discovers that the absence of an established Yugoslav identity was one 
of the key factors in Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The democratization process in the early 
1990s exposed the weakness of the Yugoslav state institutions and paved the road for a 
dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
A. NATIONALISM BEFORE WORLD WAR I 
Throughout the centuries, from the days they migrated to the Balkans until World 
War I, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes had short periods of self-governance. Slovenes had a 
brief period of self-rule in the 8th century. According to Banac, “the term Slovenia emerged 
as a geographical and national designation only in the nineteenth century.”50 Croats were 
independent from 910 to 1102. In 1102, Croatia became part of the Hungarian kingdom, 
and after 1526, came under Hapsburg rule. Serbia was an independent state from 1169 to 
1389. In 1389, the Serbs became part of the Ottoman Empire and until 1830 they did not 
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have autonomy.51 The long periods of the foreign subjugations altered the South Slavs’ 
identities.  
The dissimilar South Slav identities can be partly attributed to the frictions in the 
19th century between the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes. Oliver Zimmer, a professor studying 
European nationalism, observes that the concept of a nation, identified by a cultural 
authenticity, historical growth and political self-determination, gained popularity among 
the wider population in the last third of the 19th century. Moreover, during this period, 
nationalism become a key assembling force that politicians were able to use to gain 
control.52 Serbian politicians aimed to unite all Serbs living under Ottoman and Habsburg 
rule in one independent state. Charles Jelavich, a Balkan specialist, wrote that in 1844, Ilija 
Garašanin, Serbia’s minister of the interior, in a secret document named Načertanije (The 
Draft), drafted a plan for a future Serbian state which would unite all Serbs and did not 
refer to South Slavs unity. Furthermore, the Serbian educational system in this era was 
geared to promote the national aim. Vuk Karadžić, a preeminent Serbian scholar whose 
main contribution was a standardization of the Serbian language, held that all Slavs 
speaking the Štokavian dialect are Serbs.53 The Štokavian dialect is the Serbo-Croatian 
language. In 1914 there were 1,957,000 (or 30% of the Serbs) living under Hapsburg rule 
in Vojvodina, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Jelavich claims 
that there is no evidence that the Serbian government before 1914 was interested in 
anything other than a union of the Serbian nation.54 
The Croatian goal was to unite the lands of the Triune Kingdom— Croatia, 
Slavonia and Dalmatia—in a single nation and to integrate the Serbs, who accounted for 
25% of the population, with loyalty to Croatia. Croatian textbooks written during that time 
stressed the unity of Croatian provinces with the understanding that the lands where Serbs 
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also lived belonged to Croatia.55 The Slovenes’ goal was to unite all their provinces in a 
single political entity under the Hapsburg empire. Slovenian textbooks made an explicit 
claim that the Slovene political leaders’ loyalty was to the Hapsburg Monarchy.56 
Language usually unites nations, but in the case of Serbia and Croatia, the common 
language created conflicts. Both nations fought for what they regarded as in the best interest 
of their people, not for the South Slavs’ unity. Serbs spoke the Štokavian dialect. The Croat 
population spoke three dialects: Kajkavian, Čakavian and Štokavian. Ljudevit Gaj, the 
leader of the Illyrian movement in Croatia, played a major role in influencing the Croatian 
intellectuals to adopt the Štokavian dialect. In 1847, the Croatian policymakers declared 
the official language of the nation to be the Štokavian dialect.57 Banac observes that 
language is important for a national identity and that saving or shaping a national language 
is the first priority of nationalism.58 Croatians called the Štokavian dialect the Croatian 
language and the Serbs called it the Serbian language. They both claimed the developed 
Serbo-Croatian language literature in Dubrovnik as their own literature.59 The Slovenes 
fortunately did not have this issue because their language is somewhat different from the 
Štokavian dialect.  
The South Slavs, under two different empires, developed different traditions. 
Jelavich claims that the Croatian association with Hungary and the Austrian empire that 
lasted for over nine centuries was seen as positive by the Croats, whereas the Serbs viewed 
the Ottoman Empire with animosity.60 The Croats adopted Western Civilization and the 
Catholic religion. The Serbs were closer to Constantinople and under the influence of the 
Byzantine Empire. Therefore, they adopted the Orthodox religion. The Croats, influenced 
by Western Civilization, thought of themselves as a superior ethnicity and looked down on 
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the Serbs. The Serbs, who won their independence, considered the Croats tools of the 
Catholic Church and the Hapsburg Empire. In the years preceding World War I, relations 
between the Hapsburg Monarchy and Serbia were severely impaired. The Hapsburg 
Monarchy’s expansion in the Balkans was contested by the Serbs.  
In the years preceding World War I, it was clear that the South Slavs did not have 
a desire for unification. The 19th century was an era characterized by the emergence of 
nationalism. This nationalism was tied to the development of urbanization and the 
emergence of the middle class. During this era, the regions that the South Slavs inhabited 
were not urbanized, and there was no middle class. Eighty percent of the South Slav 
population consisted of peasants who were not interested in unification.61 Nationalism in 
the South Slavs was developed through the church and the educational system.62 However, 
the intention of the Croats, the Serbs, and the Slovenes was to shape their individual 
identities and build a nation with larger boundaries. There was little interest in a South Slav 
unification under one nation with a common identity.  
B. NATIONALISM DURING WORLD WAR I AND THE INTERWAR 
PERIOD 
Interest in unification among the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes increased during 
World War I. The tensions between the Hapsburg Monarchy and Serbia culminated after 
the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Subsequently, World War 
I commenced. Austro-Hungarian and German forces quickly defeated the Serbian Army 
and forced it to retreat to the Greek island of Corfu. During World War I, Slovenes and 
Croats served in the ranks in the Austro-Hungarian Army. The Yugoslav communist leader 
and later the president of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, served in the Austro-Hungarian 
Army during World War I. This is not to imply that the Croats and the Slovenes deliberately 
fought against the Serbs, but it does convey the fact that they were on opposing sides as 
participants in the two major alliances.  
                                                 
61 Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1992), 6. 
62 Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms-Textbooks and Yugoslav Union Before 1914, 58–60. 
27 
As the outcome of World War I became increasingly clear, the Serbs and the Croats 
started to plead their cases to the Entente Powers for an independent state. What 
complicated matters was that Italy, originally a member of the Triple Alliance, initially 
declared neutrality. After the secret London Treaty with the Triple Entente Powers in 1915, 
Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. Clearly, this treaty revealed the Italians’ desire to 
enlarge their borders at the expense of the collapsing Hapsburg Empire. This factor put 
pressure on the Croats and Slovenes to seek unification with the Serbs to avoid falling 
under Italian rule. Serbs also considered the unification advantageous, because they were 
able to unite with all the Serbs who lived in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Additionally, they were able to negotiate the head of the state to be the Serb Monarch, 
Alexander Karađorđević. Thus in 1916, the South Slavs signed the Corfu Declaration, 
which proposed the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 
The negotiations for unification were mainly between the Serbian Prime Minister, 
Nicola Pašić, and the Croat statesman Ante Trumbić, who led the Yugoslav committee. 
Alex Dragnich, the author of several works on the Balkans, summarizes the negotiation for 
unification throughout World War I as a process conducted with distrust and skepticism 
among the South Slavs.63 However, the advocates of unification prevailed. Fortunately, 
the United States President, Woodrow Wilson, did not recognize the London Treaty so the 
South Slavs kept their territories despite Italian claims. Nevertheless, the unification from 
the Croat side appears to have been based on necessity rather than desire. That can be 
perceived from the countless quarrels after World War I.  
During the period from 1918 to 1929, the South Slavs struggled to create a cohesive 
political system. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes adopted the Serbian 
governing system, which was a parliamentary monarchy. The king was a Serb from the 
dynasty of Karađorđe, and the majority of the parliament consisted of Serb nationals. The 
Croat representatives led by Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant 
Party, pushed for a greater autonomy for Croatia and distanced themselves from the 
monarchy by missing parliament sessions. Agreement on national goals became 
                                                 
63 Dragnich, Serbs and Croats, 23–34. 
28 
challenging for the executive because the parliament consisted of multiple parties based on 
regional loyalties. The Croat representatives elected to the parliament were winning 
elections based on a nationalistic view. The tensions culminated in 1928 when a 
Montenegrin representative in the parliament shot dead three Croat representatives, among 
them their leader Radić. This event showed that nationalist views were deeply imbedded 
in the South Slavs’ parliamentary representatives and that the current parliamentary system 
of government could not function well.  
King Alexander dissolved the Parliament in 1929 and renamed the country to the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Dragnich suggests that the king did not have an alternative if he 
was to preserve the existence of the unified South Slav country. King Alexander aimed to 
unify all the South Slavs under one identity—Yugoslavs. He restructured the local 
governments’ borders in nine regions that did not reflect the ethnic boundaries.64 The 
reforms he made, including changing the country’s name to Yugoslavia, suggest that he 
intended to remove the nationalism in the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes. However, 
his reforms and his centralized and authoritarian system created strong opposition among 
the Yugoslav ethnicities. Croats formed terrorist organizations abroad supported by foreign 
governments. A Bulgarian terrorist associated with Croat groups assassinated King 
Alexander in Marseilles, France, in 1934. Elections were held in 1935 for a new parliament, 
but this did not provide any changes in the government. To stabilize the situation, Prince 
Paul—King Alexander’s successor—invited Croat leaders to discuss compromises. Croat 
leaders accepted the monarchy but insisted on federalization and democratization.65 
The situation in Yugoslavia during the interwar period displays the struggle of the 
South Slavs to establish a functioning governing system. The Yugoslav political leaders’ 
inclination was to create a democratic governing system. However, the Serbs represented 
the majority of the population, and therefore they had greater representation in the 
parliament and the government. The Croats were seeking equality, and the solution was to 
establish greater autonomy within Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav king’s assessment was 
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correct: the various ethnicities within Yugoslavia had to establish a common identity. In 
the 19th century unification processes in Germany and Italy, each had a dominant state. In 
Germany it was Prussia, and in Italy Piedmont. The dominant states were able to unify 
Germany and Italy on their terms. That raises a question: why were the Serbs unable to 
establish themselves as a dominant state?  
The feud between the Serbs and the Croats in the parliament in the early years of 
Yugoslavia’s existence can be summarized as a constant struggle for power. However, it 
is clear that the Croat political parties’ objective was Croatian autonomy and the goal of 
the Serbs was the unification of Yugoslavia under the Serb monarchy. For as long as 
nationalism existed in Serbia and Croatia, the existence of Yugoslavia was doomed. The 
Serb monarchy failed to identify the root of the nationalism and eliminate it, whether by 
force or by diplomacy. Croat politicians were able to gain popularity by identifying 
themselves as part of the peasant class. For example, the leader of the Croatian Peoples’ 
Peasant Party, Stjepan Radić, who spent most of his life in an urban environment, was able 
to win elections by identifying himself as a peasant whose political aim was to improve the 
peasants’ life.66 
Clearly, Serbia in the first half of the 20th century was a superior state, politically, 
militarily, and economically within the Yugoslav Kingdom. Considerable numbers of 
ethnic Serbs populated the non-Serb territories—including Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia—in Yugoslavia. Additionally, the Croats 
needed the Serbs to protect them from Mussolini’s aggression. The Serbs were unable to 
capitalize on their superiority during the first half of the 20th century to dominate 
Yugoslavia. The assassination of King Alexander brought instability in the monarchy. 
Prince Paul temporarily took the regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia until Alexander’s 
son, King Peter II, was of age to step to the throne. Prince Paul did not have the authority 
necessary to reign as a true monarch and pursue King Alexander’s visions. Aleksa Djilas 
observes that after World War I, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had weak liberal-democratic 
institutions. The interwar period was a short time to shape the country that consisted of 
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South Slavs who had never before been under one ruler and who had little loyalty to the 
idea of Yugoslavia as a single nation.67  
C. NATIONALISM DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II  
World War II brought an end to the monarchy in Yugoslavia. In 1940, Germany 
occupied Yugoslavia, and King Peter II and his ministers were exiled in the United 
Kingdom. With the exception of the Serbs, the monarchy was not popular among the South 
Slavs. The South Slavs felt that they could not depend on the political decisions by the 
government. Therefore, the South Slavs were not committed to the country and were not 
ready to defend it. Some even welcomed foreign invasion.68 Without the king’s presence 
in Yugoslavia, the monarchy was destined to be abolished. His exile showed that he was 
not committed to the Yugoslav ideal. Furthermore, the king did not immediately establish 
local representatives of the royal government. Granted, he was only 17 years old, but the 
lack of leadership gave an opportunity to the popular communist movement to rise in 
power.  
Nationalism in Yugoslavia culminated during World War II. The Germans formed 
a puppet state known as the Independent State of Croatia ruled by the Croatian fascist 
organization, Ustaše. During World War II, the Ustaše, led by Ante Pavelić, burnt villages 
and killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs with extreme brutality. Furthermore, the Ustaše 
set up multiple concentration camps that made additional hundreds of thousands of Serbs 
victim to the genocidal policy of the regime.69 Serb nationalists were called Četniks, led 
by Dragoljub Mihailović. Unlike the Ustaše, they stood up against the Nazi oppression. 
Mihailović’s popularity among the Serbs made King Peter II’s monarchy recognize him as 
their representative in Yugoslavia.  
The activities during World War II revealed where the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
stood at that time. The Croats wanted an independent state with territories consisting of 
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Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia. However, a large Serb population lived in those territories. 
Serbs populated the territories in Croatia in the 16th century because they were given land 
by Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I so that they would serve as a buffer between Catholic 
Croatia and the mighty Ottoman Empire that threatened the West. Croatia’s unification 
faced strong resistance from the Serbian population dwelling in those territories. Moreover, 
the Serbian government, which also sought territorial expansion, would not permit the 
Croats to reign over the Serbian population. Therefore, the solution for the Ustaše—a 
Croatian nationalistic movement—was “ethnic cleansing” of the Serbs in Croatia while the 
Ustaše had support from Germany.  
The Serbs could not get international support during World War II. Mihailović was 
the representative of the exiled government in the United Kingdom. However, Tito won 
support from the United States and the United Kingdom in the form of military weapons. 
The United States’ policy in the Balkans was strongly influenced by the UK. The lack of 
military support for the Četniks suggests that the United Kingdom was not interested in 
promoting a powerful Serbian state in the Balkans. Tito, even though he was a Communist, 
was seen as a partner to the West superior to Mihailović.  
Tito’s greatest support came from the Yugoslav peasants. His model for 
brotherhood and unity of all South Slavs was widely accepted. He was able to recruit 
partisans from every ethnicity in the country. Most of the recruits were from the Serb 
population in Croatia that took refuge in Bosnia and Herzegovina.70 Until then the peasants 
had been indifferent to the idea of Yugoslav unity. However, World War II brought them 
together against the common enemy, and Tito capitalized on his message of brotherhood 
and unity. 
The communist regime did not change the nationalistic ideology of the South Slavs. 
After World War II in Western Europe, nationalism weakened because of the development 
of the liberal-democratic political culture, but in Communist Yugoslavia (despite Marxism-
Leninism) nationalism remained in its traditional form.71 Yugoslav Communism did not 
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encourage mixing between the different nationalities. Common Yugoslav universities with 
students from all nationalities did not exist, and it was rare for a student to study in a 
university that was not of his or her nationality. Thus, an intellectual class of citizens 
identifying themselves as Yugoslavs never developed. Furthermore, common economic 
and cultural projects were rare. There was not a common Yugoslav newspaper or TV 
station.  
After World War II, nationalism sporadically resurfaced, mostly in Croatia. In the 
late 1960s, a cultural and political movement, the Croatian Spring, emerged from the 
Communist Party in Croatia. Croat reformers were seeking more rights for the Republic of 
Croatia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1967, Croat scholars wrote 
a document entitled Declaration of the Status and Name of the Croatian Language, and 
published it in a newspaper, seeking recognition of Croatian as an independent language. 
In 1971, during the Croatian Spring, Croat ideologists, members of the Croatian national 
institution Matica Hrvatska, had an important role in organizing student demonstrations 
that opposed a unified and centralized system of government, and called for more rights 
for Croatia within Yugoslavia. In 1971, Tito’s patience diminished, and he abolished the 
movement by force. Tito’s authoritarian regime was able to fight nationalism swiftly. The 
nationalistic movement leaders were quickly removed from power, and order was restored. 
Tito’s regime nonetheless failed to prevent ethnic nationalism from resurfacing. The vast 
majority of the Yugoslav population were not identifying themselves as Yugoslavs. 
Yugoslavia was widely considered to be a multiethnic country. However, Djilas 
holds that Yugoslavia was homogenous in terms of ethnicity, but it was heterogeneous in 
terms of nationalistic perceptions among the Yugoslav population. The three Yugoslav 
languages—Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian, and Slovenian—are similar to each other. 
Furthermore, the similarities among the South Slavs in Yugoslavia are larger than those 
among any of its neighbors. Many of nationalities in the world united by the language, 
culture, and historical traditions are far less similar than the South Slavs in Yugoslavia. 
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However, the South Slavs’ nationalistic ideologies that were formed and widely adopted 
before World War I never dissolved.72 
The last decades of Yugoslavia’s existence were characterized by an increase in the 
numbers of citizens declaring themselves Yugoslavs. Dejan Jovic observed that, from 1974 
to 1990, the emergence of Yugoslav culture was mainly seen through the popularity of 
Yugoslav rock music. The musicians, regardless of their nationalities, were popular 
throughout Yugoslavia. From 1971 to 1981, the number of citizens declaring themselves 
Yugoslavs increased from 273,000 to 1.2 million. That was an increase from 1.3% to 5.4% 
within a decade. Additionally, from 1981 to 1991, those declaring themselves Yugoslavs 
further increased to one fifth of the total Yugoslav population.73 
In 1967, the Yugoslav government recognized separate cultural systems for its 
nationalities. This made it more difficult for the South Slavs to form a shared identity. Jovic 
states that in Yugoslavia nationalism predominated because a single culture did not exist, 
nor were there “Yugoslav political institutions that would represent the citizens of 
Yugoslavia.”74 However, he rejects the thesis that nationalism has always been present 
among the South Slavs, but was frozen during Communism.75 
D. CONCLUSION  
In summary, the question of nationalism was the most significant in relations 
between the Serbs and the Croats. Nationalism is deeply embedded in them, and it was 
historically easy to exploit, such as the Ustaše atrocities in World War II and the massive 
genocides during the Civil War in Yugoslavia in 1990s, conducted predominantly by the 
Serbs. Serbian politicians argue that the Serbs made the largest contributions in establishing 
Yugoslavia in 1918 and made greater sacrifices than other ethnicities in Yugoslavia in 
World War I and World War II. Furthermore, the Serbs represented the largest proportion 
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of the Yugoslav population in Serbia and also inhabited large areas in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the Serbs’ goal was to combine the territories 
where all the Serbs lived in one country. 
Croat politicians were afraid that their power in Yugoslavia would weaken with 
democratization. They feared that with free elections, the majority of the votes would go 
to the Serbs due to the larger Serb populations. Therefore, the Croats supported the 
Slovenes’ option to democratize within the republic, while the Serbs favored 
democratization at the federal level. Jovic believes that democratization in Yugoslavia as 
a whole would have created a politically united nation.76 The popularity of a Yugoslav 
identity was on the rise in the last two decades of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s existence. Consequently, the biggest losers from the establishment of 
Yugoslav democracy would have been the Croatian and Slovenian political elites. 
Therefore, nationalism resurfaced at the height of the possibility for a democratic 
Yugoslavia, as the only means to preserve the power of the regional governments.  
Prior to World War I, the South Slavs were never one nation nor did they express 
loyalty to the idea of one South Slav nation. Building a unified South Slav nation proved 
to be more challenging than anticipated. To local peasants, it mattered little under whose 
rule they would be, but it did matter who could provide protection. The monarchy, early in 
the founding of Yugoslavia, failed to provide reliable security and establish institutions 
that would encourage shared South Slav identity. The one party authoritarian Communist 
regime was able to balance the power of the different nationalities within the government 
and keep the political elites satisfied, if not happy. The democratization efforts threatened 
the balance of power among the nationalities. In the face of the nationalistic propaganda 
from political leaders in the 1990s, the Croats and the Serbs had to choose sides. Without 
a well-established Yugoslav identity, it was natural for the Serbs and the Croats to turn to 
their nationalistic roots.  
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III. THE FAILURE OF THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNING SYSTEM 
TO BUILD A STABLE ECONOMY  
The history of Yugoslavia’s economy consisted of a series of ineffective economic 
policies that occasionally needed the implementation of necessary reforms in order to 
correct them. The objective was to remove elements of Yugoslavia’s socioeconomic 
system that impeded dynamic economic growth. Furthermore, the polices aimed to narrow 
the economic disparities between the Yugoslav regions and funded the less-developed 
regions with resources from the better developed regions. Yet, the policies did not bring 
economic convergence in Yugoslavia. Numerous post-World War II economic reforms, 
intended to balance the economic disparities, failed. The reforms would regularly prove to 
be ineffective. They were fabricated to serve the interest of particular ethnicities in order 
to preserve a political power. This chapter explains Yugoslavia’s economic framework, 
presents its most important institutional and developmental characteristics, and finally 
examines to what extent Yugoslavia’s failed economy led to its dissolution.  
A. OVERVIEW OF YUGOSLAVIA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
From 1920, until the outbreak of World War II, Yugoslavia did not make noticeable 
economic progress. Economic growth was partly a consequence of demographic growth; 
and it is clearly visible, from Yugoslavia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data, that the 
economy during this period was mostly stagnant.77 In 1939–1945, World War II caused 
severe difficulties for economic development in Yugoslavia. During World War II, more 
than 1.7 million people died, at an average age of 22, which was twice more than the 
civilian and military casualties of the United Kingdom and the United States combined.78  
However, during the post-World War II period, Yugoslavia sustained exponential 
economic growth. In the period from 1950 to 1979, GDP per capita increased over four 
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times.79 Indeed, Yugoslavia achieved greater economic progress after World War II. 
However, this trend was not unique to Yugoslavia. During this period, rebuilding after 
World War II caused substantial economic development around the globe. 
After World War II, Yugoslavia aligned its economic development with the West. 
Susan Woodward believes that the Yugoslav economic system depended, throughout the 
post-World War II period, on the balancing act between the East and the West:  
The core of the balancing act was a strategic bargain struck with the West: 
it would maintain a strong military capacity independent of Moscow, 
including a critical role in defense of NATO’s southern flank against 
possible Soviet movement west, in exchange for Western economic 
assistance and membership in global economic organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), with its access to World Bank loans, 
association with European trading blocs (the EFTA and the EC), and by 
1965, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).80 
This bargain was a foundation on which the economic development within the 
Yugoslav socialist system was based. 
In the period from 1979 to 1989, there was no increase in per capita income in 
Yugoslavia. Stagnation in economic development occurred in the neighboring states 
Bulgaria and Hungary, but not in Greece or Austria.81 It is apparent that this stagnation 
was not the result of broader European economic difficulties nor was it a global movement. 
Therefore, studying the Yugoslav economic trends during this period is certainly an 
important factor to understand the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
B. BARRIERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY  
From the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 until the Civil War in the 1990s, the 
economic development had been either slow or unsustainable. According to economist 
Vladimir Gligorov, after World War II, “non-democratic solutions and the non-liberal 
economic policy temporarily contributed to stabilization, but in the long run they signified 
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the abandonment of a more durable political community.”82 In the long term, 
disagreements between nationalist interests, in terms of economic development, caused the 
Yugoslav economy to lag behind the capitalist developed countries.  
Yugoslavia was geographically located in proximity to the developed world. Thus, 
economic backwardness could not be explained by a geographical cutoff from access to 
the world markets. Moreover, at the time of the stagnation in the 1980s, when the 
democratic political changes were inevitable, circumstances were favorable for Yugoslavia 
to join the developed world. Therefore, the lack of economic development in the post-
World War II period can be seen as a result of the adoption of polices made by the Yugoslav 
statesman. 
Throughout the history of Yugoslavia, uneven tax distribution among the regions 
were subject of the most intense political disputes. Furthermore, the spending of public 
funds—investing more in undeveloped areas and less into developed ones—increased 
tensions among the Yugoslav regions. Dinko Dubravčić, a Croatian economist, believes 
that the redistribution of income is crucially important for the state to function well. 
Redistribution should be implemented among citizens with different amounts of wealth, 
economic sectors, or regions of a state. The democratic states’ motive for redistribution of 
income is to strengthen their political and economic power in relation to foreign 
competitors.83 Therefore, it is not surprising that Yugoslavia invested more public funds 
in underdeveloped areas, since regional differences should also be expected to decrease 
after state unions, which is a key economic justification for the creation of a common state.  
Gligorov notes that, in the post-World War II period, it should have been expected 
that less developed regions would have superior growth rates than developed ones.84 
However, that was not the case in Yugoslavia. According to the World Bank data, in 1973, 
household income in Slovenia was the highest in Yugoslavia. In relation to Slovenians’, 
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the household income in Croatia was five-sixth, Serbia and Vojvodina two-thirds, and the 
other republics around one-half. Kosovo was lagging far behind with one-third. Slovenia 
with a GNP per capita of $3,802 compared with several western European countries while 
Kosovo with $627 per capita was comparable with the developing countries. The income 
disparities between Slovenia and Kosovo, during Yugoslavia’s existence, were as high as 
a 6 to 1 ratio.85 
C. UNSUCCESSFUL ECONOMIC REFORMS IN POST-WORLD WAR II 
PERIOD 
Yugoslavia’s policymakers failed to create equal economic progress among the 
various regions of the country. After systemic economic changes in the mid-1960s, the 
economic regional development remained relatively unaffected. With the exception of 
Kosovo, regional differences ranged between ratios from 1 to 3.86 However, the fact that 
the economic regional differences did not decrease not did they change significantly shows 
that the national funds appropriated to support the less developed regions did not generate 
economic equality. Gligorov implies that Yugoslavia’s economic failure may have been 
the economic system that was constructed to favor the underdeveloped areas over the 
developed. Conversely, the economic policies over the decades failed to increase the level 
of economic development of less developed regions to the high-performance levels of 
Slovenia and Croatia.87 
One of the main hurdles to Yugoslav economic growth was the complex economic 
system. Patricia Taylor, Grendjean Burke, and Niko Tos acknowledge that the evolution 
of the Yugoslav economic system was a result of the dispute between Tito and Stalin in 
1948. Yugoslavia was expelled from membership in the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform), and its economic cooperation with the communist bloc countries was lost. 
Consequently, Yugoslavia turned for help to the World Bank. This led to the origins of the 
complex Yugoslav economic system that was designed to link the communist ideology 
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with the free market economy. The core of the new system was the self-management of the 
enterprises introduced in 1950. It was a hybrid of capitalistic and socialist systems that 
limited the communist government’s interference with management and gave more 
freedom to the managers in running the enterprises.88 
According to Woodward, the Yugoslav socialism was combination of “socialist 
ideals and policies with openness to the world economy.”89 One of the main systemic 
differences between capitalism and socialism is the process of making investment 
decisions. With nationalization of the funds, the state monopolized the investment 
decisions. With introduction of the self-management system, the Yugoslav policymakers 
gave decision-making authority to enterprises. Woodward wrote that the self-management 
handed Yugoslav workers influence in decision-making within the enterprises on issues 
such as whether the profits would go to wages or to new investments, allotting the cost of 
labor and deciding whether it is appropriate to cut wage levels temporarily or to dismiss 
employees. Enterprises were managed by directors who were elected by workers’ councils. 
Members of the workers’ councils were elected representatives from the enterprises’ 
workforce.90 
The reform of the 1960s brought substantial changes in the Yugoslav economy. The 
central state investment fund was abolished. According to Dinko Dubravčić, until 1966, 
“the main channels of transfers from the developed to the less developed regions were the 
federal budget and central investment funds.” In 1966, the federal fund for the development 
of the underdeveloped republics and provinces (FNP) was established to satisfy the 
Croatian and Slovenian demands to set up a threshold and limit investment to the less 
developed regions.91 Moreover, investment decisions were transferred to the enterprises. 
Changes in the banking system and the public finance system were also significant. 
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Gligorov says that the reform designated the Yugoslav commercial banks as facilitators of 
financial relations between the Yugoslav enterprises and the world.92 
The intention of the economic reform in the mid-1960s was to encourage 
association with foreign markets and increase the efficiency of the Yugoslav enterprises’ 
investments. The Yugoslav commercial banks were able to take deposits in foreign 
currency and progressively became capable of borrowing abroad and issuing loans to the 
domestic enterprises. Yet, direct foreign and private domestic investments were both 
unattainable, which were drawbacks that subsequently had to be eliminated.93 The 
economic system was capable of generating foreign funds and providing financial subsidies 
for the Yugoslav economy. Nevertheless, the economic reform that intended to establish a 
system for increasing the efficiency of the economy served as apparatus to maintain the 
old system by creating a false sense of stability. 
Yugoslavia’s economic policy reforms in the 1960s were getting closer to 
privatization and democratization. Some constitutional solutions from the 1960s seem to 
have started in that direction. Furthermore, Yugoslavia had opened its borders for increased 
international cooperation. All of these systemic solutions had the character of a state that 
was inclined to change to privatization and democratization. However, the political 
changes went in a completely different direction. Nationalistic movements intensified and 
threatened to break up the state. Privatization was stopped, and Yugoslavia further 
distanced itself from democratization. The outcome was that most of the economic changes 
mainly strengthened the Yugoslav republics and provinces on account of the federation. 
Nevertheless, Yugoslavia became a much more open economy following the economic 
reform in the 1960s. 
The 1970s were considered the golden age in Yugoslavia. According to Gligorov, 
the dinar was strong, foreign import goods were available, and the infrastructure was 
somewhat reconstructed or built. In the 1970s, the Yugoslav economy was operating at a 
negative real interest rate. With the previous reforms, the federal government lost its ability 
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to regulate the fiscal policy, and the monetary policy became a primary instrument for 
instituting economic policy. The federal government lowered the interest rates below the 
rate of inflation. This resulted in an increase in investment and consumption, which were 
financed by borrowing abroad, and the growth of imports. As the money was cheap in the 
1970s, Yugoslavia national debt continued to increase.94 The World Bank report showed 
that by 1979, Yugoslavia had sixty loans that totaled over 2 billion U.S. dollars. That put 
Yugoslavia among the five largest borrowers in the world.95 
D. YUGOSLAV ECONOMY IN THE 1980S: DESTINED TO COLLAPSE  
After the Tito-Stalin fallout, Yugoslav’s economic dependence on Western capital 
and Western markets continued to grow. Even if there was a feeling of well-being, it was 
not built on stable economic foundations. The economy was sustainable as long as foreign 
creditors were willing to lend. From 1965 to 1987, the national debt increased from $1.3 
billion to $22.2 billion U.S. dollars. That amounted to an increase per year of about 18%.96  
Branko Horvat and Helen Kramer point out that in the 1980s the credit-worthiness of 
Yugoslavia fell to the lowest ranking in its existence. International creditors were reluctant 
to lend to Yugoslavia. Inflation reached 50%, and economists expected it to remain the 
same. However, Slovenia maintained its full employment, fueled by its exports to Western 
markets. In contrast, Kosovo experienced the highest levels of unemployment and 
migration to the West.97 In 1984 Yugoslavia’s unemployment reached levels above 20% 
except in Slovenia and Croatia. In 1985, 59.6 % of those unemployed in Yugoslavia as a 
whole were 25 and under.98 
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By the 1980s, Yugoslavia was no longer able to repay foreign debts. Moreover, the 
IMF requirements for lending funds to Yugoslavia became more radical.99 At the same 
time, Yugoslavia had a large trade deficit, but this time, due to the increased requirements, 
borrowing was not an option. Gligorov illustrated that Yugoslavia could not find proper 
solutions to the economic troubles in a timely manner. It became necessary to adjust the 
balance of imports and exports. In addition, it was necessary to refinance the existing debts 
at significantly higher and unsustainable interest rates.100 
The first hurdle was the dispute over the possible solutions. According to Gligorov, 
the devaluation of the dinar would had redistributed the costs among the republics. The 
devaluation would had benefited tourism and exports sectors. However, the products 
manufactured for the domestic market would have to go up in price. There was no 
compensation mechanism, because the federal government could no longer provide a 
financial support for those who needed assistance with income generated by taxing those 
who benefited from the reform. The central bank used the exchange rate and selective 
lending to compensate for this, but its actions only increased disputes because the 
conditions were unequal.101 
These obstacles to the relatively quick resolution of foreign debt problems led to 
the difficulty in re-launching economic production. The economy stagnated for a decade 
with a steady growth of inflation and unemployment. Over the course of the 1980s, the 
advocates for economic solutions could not gain public support. The developing republics 
consistently emphasized the inequity of the fiscal system, which allegedly directed funds 
to less-developed areas. It was not until late 1989 that the government of Yugoslav Prime 
Minster Ante Marković started to change these system characteristics, which resulted in 
favorable economic trends beginning in 1990. 
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How was it possible for a country with solid economic growth in three decades after 
World War II to collapse in the 1980s? Vesna Bojicic, a senior research fellow at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, finds that the Yugoslav economic 
system failed to remove the barriers for economic growth caused by the socialist economic 
system.102 Furthermore, Yugoslavia’s economic system was not built on a stable 
foundation. Horvat explains that the people who constructed Yugoslavia’s economic 
system did not understand how the system should function. If the self-management system 
was criticized then, automatically, the critics would be labeled as anti-socialist, and with 
that possibly face consequences.103 Nevertheless, the increase in unemployment was 
attributed to the institutional factors, including self-management. With the elimination of 
shareholders in the enterprises, there was no incentive for the companies to grow. 
In an enterprise, employees’ incentive is to increase their wages and not to increase 
the size of the company. Where the workers’ interest is higher wages, the shareholders’ 
interest is growth in the value of their investments. In Yugoslavia’s socialism, the 
shareholder was the state. The state incentives for companies to grow are not as high as 
those of shareholders. Therefore, the workers’ objective of higher wages prevented 
investment for research and development, and ultimately increased unemployment. 
Woodward believes that the self-management system made the Yugoslav citizens define 
their identities, economic interest, social status, and political loyalty based on their 
employment status.104 
Second, since the very creation of the Yugoslav state, the distribution of benefits 
and cost amongst its constituents repeatedly generated intense debates and disagreements. 
The FNP was the only remaining fiscal means of redistribution of the national fund. Yet, 
the economic framework was not accepted by the individual national communities. It was 
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widely considered among all Yugoslav republics that the fiscal system was unfair. In the 
end, the country collapsed because of a dispute over who contributed more and who 
benefited more from the national fund for underdeveloped regions. This dispute should 
have been expected, since the reduction in fiscal jurisdiction of the federal government was 
a key requirement in the period from 1968 until its breakup.  
The different views concerning the future of the Yugoslav economy divided the 
regions between centralist and de-centralist approaches. Centralists pushed for tax 
collection by the federal tax authorities. De-centralists believed that the federal budget 
should be reduced, with less money appropriated for the Yugoslav Army.105  Serbs and the 
rest of the undeveloped regions were on the centralist side of the argument and Croatia and 
Slovenia on the de-centralist. Serbs argued that per capita income differences between 
developed and less developed regions had increased and that a redistribution of income 
was needed. Developed regions countered that the funds were used in extremely inefficient 
ways. They could only agree on general principles: free trade, exchange of goods and 
services, and capital and labor movement between the regions. Furthermore, Woodward 
observes that in order to meet the condition of the IMF in 1970s, the Yugoslav central 
government gave greater economic autonomy to the republics with respect to economic 
decision making.106  
Finally, Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
The World Bank, the IMF, and other financial institutions increased the qualification 
requirements for lending to Yugoslavia. In the late 1980s, Marković’s push for reforms in 
the Yugoslav economy were not supported by the IMF and the World Bank. His economic 
reforms favored increasing democratic policies from the precedents in the 1960s and the 
1970s. However, Yugoslavia lost its geopolitical importance and Western nations shifted 
their focus to the ex-communist countries in Central Europe. 
                                                 
105 Dubravčić, “Economic Causes and Political Context of the Dissolution of a Multinational Federal 
State,” 267–68. 
106 Woodward, “The Political Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia,” 79. 
45 
IV. THE YUGOSLAV POLITICAL ELITES AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Communist system in Yugoslavia was 
destined to collapse. New political elites emerged to lead Yugoslavia’s democratization. 
Paradoxically these elites had deep roots in the Communist regime. An examination of the 
contributing factors that led to the election of the Yugoslav leaders may help to explain the 
emergence of mass nationalism among the different ethnicities in Yugoslavia. By 
examining the ways in which Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and Croatian President 
Franjo Tuđman affected the Yugoslav people’s lives, this thesis sheds some light on one 
of the possible underlying causes for the tragic Yugoslav Civil War in the early 1990s. 
Understanding the Yugoslav political elites’ positions on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
and the actions that followed, will also be a factor to take into account in this attempt to 
interpret the tragic events. 
This thesis concludes that the Yugoslav political elites in the late 1980s and early 
1990s were responsible for the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s. Furthermore, foreign powers, 
particularly the United States, had a huge impact on the outcome of the conflict in 
Yugoslavia by their late intervention. Richard Holbrooke, the chief negotiator representing 
the United States during the Yugoslav crisis, wrote that the Yugoslavian crisis was the 
result of “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.”107 This 
chapter examines international politics as a factor in the Yugoslav dissolution. 
Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the immoral domestic and the inadequate international 
policies in Yugoslavia that created a hostile environment and escalated into a civil war. By 
specifically examining the ways in which Yugoslav political elites and international 
politics influenced the outcome of the Yugoslav Civil War, this chapter contributes to the 
larger body of work that assesses European policies in the Balkans.  
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A. THE RISE OF SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOŠEVIĆ: “BUTCHER OF 
THE BALKANS” 
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević was a key political figure in the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia. According to Holbrooke, Milošević “bore the heaviest responsibility” for 
all the wars in Yugoslavia.108 He rose in power by being the right-hand man to the Serbian 
President, Ivan Stambolić, who Milošević later betrayed and forced to resign. It is 
interesting how Milošević managed to gain popularity and succeed in overthrowing 
Stambolić. Warren Zimmermann, the U.S. Ambassador in Yugoslavia, described 
Milošević as “an opportunist, not an ideologue, a man driven by power rather than 
nationalism. He has made a Faustian pact with nationalism as a way to gain and hold 
power.”109 An example of that behavior was his trip in Kosovo in 1987. Stambolić sent 
him to Kosovo to reduce the tension between the government of Kosovo, consisting mainly 
of ethnic Albanians, and the nationalist Serbs faction, which posed challenges to the 
Kosovo government. From this visit, Milošević quickly recognized that he could use Serb 
nationalism to gain power. His narrative was that Kosovo was not just part of Serbia; it 
was the heart of Serbia. Ethnic Albanians forced out Serbs from Kosovo. Therefore, Serbs 
must protect the remaining Serbs in Kosovo. Zimmermann compared the significance of 
Kosovo to the Serbs with that of Jerusalem to the Jews.110 Milošević’s popularity increased 
and surpassed that of Stambolić, with his strong stance against the ethnic Albanian 
government and firm support for the nationalist Serbs in Kosovo.  
B. FRANJO TUĐMAN: THE FATHER OF THE COUNTRY–CROATIA  
Franjo Tuđman, the Croatian President in 1990–1999, had deep Croatian nationalist 
roots. Biographer Darko Hudelist suggests that Tuđman’s father had a vast influence on 
Tuđman’s political orientation. In the interwar period, Tuđman’s father was a member of 
the Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party.111 The political party had a strong separatist view and 
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argued for Croatian autonomy.112 In 1960, Tuđman became the youngest general in the 
Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). Joe Tripician’s analysis shows that it was unusual for a 
Croat to rise to the rank of general in the YPA. Nevertheless, he resigned from serving in 
the YPA in 1961, and decided to go into politics. He was arrested twice for contributing to 
Croatian nationalistic movements.113 His first arrest was in 1972 and his second in 
1982.114  
Tuđman’s biographers imply that his heart was never in Yugoslavia. However, his 
rise to the rank of general at the age of 38 could suggest that he had a robust network of 
sponsors. After he was released from prison, in the 1980s he traveled in the West looking 
for support from Croat immigrants. One of his biggest supporters was a Croat-Canadian 
businessman, Gojko Šušak, who bankrolled his elections. According to the New York 
Times, Šušak had a strong sentiment for the Ustaše movement during World War II.115 It 
is apparent that during the 1980s Tuđman was trying to advance his political ambition 
based on Croatian nationalism. He won the 1990 Croatian presidential election based on a 
strong nationalist campaign. The U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, 
considered Tuđman’s campaign extreme in nature and filled with immoral statements such 
as “that he was glad his wife was neither a Serb nor a Jew,” and decided not to meet 
Tuđman until he won the Croatian presidency. Zimmermann in their first meeting 
confronted Tuđman’s radical campaign statements, but Tuđman evaded the question in 
favor of focusing on Croatian history. Zimmermann concluded that Tuđman’s concept of 
governance was not based on democratic values.116  
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C. SLOVENE CONCERN WITH SERB AGGRESSION IN KOSOVO 
The Slovenian President from 1991 to 2002, Milan Kučan, undoubtedly had 
stronger democratic values than the rest of the Yugoslav political elites. Zimmermann 
points out that Kučan’s administration followed democratic principles such as free 
elections, freedom of the press, and a free market economy that leaned to the West. 
However, Slovenes were frightened by Milošević’s rise to power. His gangster-like attitude 
and imperialistic arrogance made Slovenes doubt if they could manage to live within a 
united Yugoslavia. In a discussion with Zimmermann, Kučan described the Serb 
aggression in Kosovo as “the worst human rights problem in Europe.”117 The population 
in Slovenia was ethnically homogenous and there were no territorial disputes with the other 
Yugoslav republics. The question arises: why were Slovenes worried about Kosovo?  
Within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Kosovo and 
Vojvodina were autonomous provinces of Serbia. Tito gave the two provinces autonomy 
out of fear that Serbia, with its larger territory and population within Yugoslavia, could 
overpower the other republics. Therefore, both provinces had a representative in the 
Yugoslav Council of Presidency to limit the Serbs’ influence in the government. 
Milošević’s control over Vojvodina and Kosovo gave him two extra votes in the Council 
of Presidency. With Montenegro historically siding with the Serbs, that meant a total of 
four votes out of eight.118 Decisions in the Yugoslav Council of Presidency had to have a 
majority vote to pass. In the late 1980s, Serbia controlled four votes, but it needed one more 
to control the decision making by the Yugoslav Council of Presidency. The four votes led 
to a stalemate in the early 1990s.  
D. HEADLESS STATE 
In May 1991, it was Croatia’s turn to take the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Stipe 
Mesić, chosen by the Croatian Parliament, was to be the President of Yugoslavia from May 
1991 to May 1992. According to Mesić, for the previous twelve presidents, the Yugoslav 
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Council confirming Yugoslav presidents was a formality, not a contested vote. His 
appointment to serve as President of the Yugoslav Council by the Croatian Parliament 
should have been confirmed without contest. The Serbs, controlling four votes, opposed 
his appointment, and, with a stalemate, Yugoslavia did not have a president.119  
Serb domination in the Yugoslav Council raised concerns in all the other Yugoslav 
republics. One of the key authorities of the Yugoslav Council was to give orders to the 
Army. Originally, the Croatian Parliament had selected Stipe Šuvar to be the Croat 
representative to the Yugoslav Council. In 1990, after Tuđman’s Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ) party won the elections in Croatia, Šuvar was replaced by Mesić. By 
appointing Mesić, Tuđman showed that he had different ideas for Yugoslavia. The Serbs 
had a reasonable concern about Mesić’s appointment due to the HDZ’s strong nationalist 
campaign and its evident objective of an independent Croatia. However, the Serbs in 
denying Mesić the presidency violated the Yugoslav Constitution. On the other hand, if 
Mesić had been elected the President of SFRY, the Croatians would have controlled the 
YPA, and the Serbs would had lost their control of the Yugoslav Council.  
Serbia’s strategy in the stalemate was to create a state of emergency and give power 
to the YPA to act independently. Most of the YPA’s generals were Serbs, including the 
Minister of Defense, General Veljko Kadijević. Nevertheless, the YPA leadership’s 
pressure on the Yugoslav Council to declare a national emergency failed. General 
Kadijević made it clear that he would not do anything without the council vote. He intended 
to remove the leadership in Slovenia and Croatia and prevent secession. Undoubtedly, this 
kind of behavior from the republics under Tito’s regime would have been quashed by 
Belgrade. However, Kadijević, without backup from prominent foreign powers, could not 
operate independently. His actions would have probably been seen as a coup and might 
have led to NATO action against the YPA. The Serbs had a military advantage and could 
have attacked Zagreb, but they did not have allies. The Croats had support from Austria, 
Germany, and Hungary.  
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E. THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS IN THE EARLY 1990S 
The Yugoslav crisis started in Krajina, a region in Croatia settled with a majority 
Serb population. Since the YPA could not act overtly in the crisis, the Serbs’ strategy 
changed. In June 1991, after Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia, the Serb 
media planted fear in the Serbs from Krajina. Noel Malcolm, an English political journalist, 
described watching Radio Television Belgrade “as if all television in the USA had been 
taken over by the Ku Klux Klan.” He asserted that propaganda of this type and magnitude 
would have started a war even in the USA.120 Backed by the YPA, the Serbs established 
the autonomous region of Krajina (SAO Krajina).121 The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, in the summary of the judgement concerning the Serbian leader 
in Krajina, Milan Martić, concluded as follows: 
The evidence presented to this Trial Chamber has shown that the President 
of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, openly supported the preservation of 
Yugoslavia as a federation of which the SAO Krajina would form part. 
However, the evidence has established that Slobodan Milošević covertly 
intended the creation of a Serb state. This state was to be created through 
the establishment of paramilitary forces and the provocation of incidents in 
order to create a situation where the JNA [YPA] could intervene. Initially, 
the JNA [YPA] would intervene to separate the parties but subsequently the 
JNA [YPA] would intervene to secure the territories envisaged to be part of 
a future Serb state.122 
F. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND UNITED STATES POLICIES IN 
YUGOSLAVIA 
In the early 1990s, Western nations had different views on how to resolve the crisis 
in Yugoslavia. Austria and Germany pushed for recognition of the independence of Croatia 
and Slovenia. On the other hand, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
supported the unity of the republics in Yugoslavia. On 21 June 1991, the United States 
made its position clear when the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, visited 
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Belgrade. According to Zimmermann, “Baker told Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and 
Slovene President Milan Kučan that the United States would not encourage or support 
unilateral secession; he hoped they would not secede, but if they had to leave, he urged 
them to leave by negotiated agreement.”123  
The United States chief negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, claimed that one of the key 
factors for the Yugoslav tragedy in the early 1990s was the U.S. reliance on the European 
Community (EC) to handle the crisis. With the United States preoccupied with the war in 
Kuwait and Iraq in 1990, for United States policy makers the Yugoslavian issues became 
insignificant. Additionally, U.S. politicians did not want to get involved in the crisis prior 
to the United States presidential election in 1992. Therefore, Holbrooke suggests, the future 
of Yugoslavia was left in the hands of the EC. In the post-World War II era, the Yugoslav 
crisis was the first major security issue in Europe in which the EC was negotiating without 
prominent United States involvement.124 Four days after U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker departed Belgrade, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, and the war in 
Slovenia commenced. This suggests that the Slovenes and the Croats correctly understood 
the U.S. position of not wanting involvement in combat in Yugoslavia. 
After the war in Slovenia erupted, the EC sent representatives to negotiate peace, 
but the United States did not. The outcome of the negotiation was a cease-fire and the 
establishment of the Slovenes’ autonomy. However, EC negotiators failed to determine 
Milošević’s intent. The YPA, considerably more powerful, was nonetheless defeated 
quickly by the Slovenian Army. Milošević understood that with Slovenia’s secession he 
would dominate Yugoslavia. After war erupted in Croatia, the British politician, Lord 
Carrington, was appointed to lead the diplomatic peace talks between the EC and the 
Yugoslav political elites. However, his efforts were negated by Germany’s firm stance on 
recognizing the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.  
Lord Carrington heavily criticized Germany’s intention to recognize the 
independence of Croatia and Slovenia. First, he believed that the recognition could be 
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powerful leverage for negotiating a peace agreement. Second, he understood that if the EC 
recognized Croatia and Slovenia without negotiating a peace agreement a war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH) was inevitable. BiH might follow Slovenia and Croatia in secession 
from Yugoslavia. The population in BiH, which consisted of a mix of Muslims, Croats, 
and Serbs, had complex views about secession from Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, Germany’s 
strong position on the matter prevailed, and the EC decided to recognize the independence 
of Slovenia and Croatia.  
Germany’s strong push for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia was baffling. 
Holbrooke states that, despite opposition from Lord Carrington, the United States, and 
many EC members, Germany’s stance was so strong that it threatened European unity. 
After the Cold War, the United States welcomed the idea of Germany emerging as an even 
more influential actor in shaping European policy. Therefore, the United States ultimately 
sided with Germany’s position concerning Yugoslavia.125 The Nazi connection with the 
Ustaše government in Croatia during World War II was well known. However, the 
connection between the democratic German leadership of the 1990s and the nationalistic 
Tuđman regime was unusual. Germany’s strong position concerning the recognition of 
Croatia and Slovenia, despite the high risk of a greater Yugoslav Civil War, was alarming.  
This raises a question: what was Germany’s motive for recognizing the 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia? German unification in the 19th century was 
achieved by bloodshed. Otto von Bismarck famously stated that “it is not by speeches and 
majority resolutions that the great questions of the time are decided – that was the big 
mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by iron and blood.”126 Yugoslavia was a sovereign state 
in which Slovenia and Croatia were component republics. This thesis is not suggesting that 
Slovenia and Croatia should not have been allowed to secede. However, the Yugoslavs 
should have been given more time for negotiation and the EC should have discouraged 
secession unless it proved absolutely necessary. Slovenia and Croatia would not have 
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declared independence in June 1991 without German support, just as General Kadijević 
would not act independently against the Slovene and Croat governments without the Soviet 
Union’s support. Moscow refused to provide such support.  
German leaders must have been aware of Tuđman’s nationalistic attitude. Once 
Croatia declared independence, the HDZ instituted the checkerboard as the Croatian coat 
of arms. The checkerboard flag was used by the Ustaše during World War II. Furthermore, 
the Croatian state police, including the ethnic Serbs in Krajina, were required to wear the 
checkerboard on their uniforms. To require ethnic Serbs to wear checkerboard insignia on 
their uniforms would be similar to requiring Jews to wear the swastika. If Tuđman’s vision 
was to create an independent Croatia with 25% of population consisting of Serbs, he would 
not have implemented a checkerboard for a coat of arms. This action suggests that he aimed 
to provoke the Serb populations in Croatia, and (when the time was right) to eradicate them. 
At the end of the Yugoslav crisis, Tuđman succeeded in achieving an ethnically “clean” 
Croatia. According to World Atlas data, currently the overwhelming majority of the 
population in Croatia consists of ethnic Croats. After 1991, the proportion of the Croat 
population increased from 78% to 91%, while the Serb population declined to less than 
4%.127  
The Germans’ motive in the crisis is unclear. However, their actions during the 
Yugoslav crisis suggest that their aim was the disintegration of Yugoslavia. After the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Germany became a more influential power in Europe. Croatia 
and Slovenia were soon to be on track to become members of the EC. Germany possibly 
saw a unified Yugoslavia, with a majority Serb population, as a barrier to its objective. 
With independent states in Slovenia and Croatia, Germany could establish its presence in 
the region more easily than with a united Yugoslavia.  
G. UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOSNIA CONFLICT 
Four years of failed EC-led peace negotiations resulted in intense ethnic war 
involving the Bosniaks, the Bosnian Serbs, and the Bosnian Croats in BiH. This required 
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United States and NATO intervention to solve the Yugoslav crisis. All three ethnicities 
fought each other in order to grab bigger pieces of territory. Neither the Serbs nor the Croats 
wanted their military forces to be seen as aggressors in BiH. However, the CIA’s National 
Intelligence Estimates show that paramilitary groups directed from Belgrade and Zagreb 
led “ethnic cleansing” activities in BiH.128 
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
Milošević and Tuđman were leaders of joint criminal enterprises. Milošević was “charged 
with leading a joint criminal enterprise to permanently remove the majority of non-Serbs 
from large swaths of territory in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo by violent 
means.”129 Likewise, “the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s findings that key 
members of Croatia’s then-leadership, including President Franjo Tuđman, Defense 
Minister Gojko Šušak, and Janko Bobetko, a senior General in the Croatian Army, shared 
the criminal purpose to ethnically cleanse Bosnian Muslims and contributed to realizing 
that goal.”130 
The United States government was not involved in the Yugoslav crisis in the early 
1990s, resulting in an arduous and complex situation in BiH. The Bosniaks, sometimes 
called the Muslims, suffered the most casualties resulting from “ethnic cleansing” 
operations conducted by the Serbs and the Croats. While the Serbs’ atrocities were far 
worse than those of the Croats, Bosnian Croats also conducted “ethnic cleansing” 
operations. The ICTY concluded that the Croats formed a “joint criminal enterprise aimed 
at creating a Croatian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would facilitate the 
reunification of the Croatian people, through ethnic cleansing of the Muslim 
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population.”131 Furthermore, the Croat leader Stipe Mesić in a BBC interview admitted 
the existence of concentration camps run by Bosnian Croats. The camps would not have 
been possible without Tuđman’s approval.132 The United States approach in resolving the 
conflict included creating an alliance between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Croats. This 
was an astute approach because an alliance between the Bosniaks and the Bosnian Serbs 
was impossible, and alliance between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs would 
have meant that BiH would not exist anymore. 
By 1995, Serbs controlled about a quarter of Croat territory in Krajina and parts of 
Slavonia. The United States knew that Tuđman wanted those territories back and used that 
leverage to convince him to give up his interest in BiH. Zimmermann disclosed a theory 
that, in 1991, Milošević and Tuđman had a secret meeting on how to divide BiH.133 This 
could explain occasional Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat joint attacks on Bosniaks in 
BiH.134 Tuđman decided to move against the Serbs in Croatia. In a BBC interview, Peter 
Galbraith, U.S. Ambassador to Croatia in 1993–1998, said the United States knew that the 
operation would take place. Tuđman laughed and said that the United States has a good 
intelligence service, and proceeded with his operation as planned.135 According to the Los 
Angeles Times, “Tudjman… asked Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith whether the 
United States had any objections to Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia via Croatia. Two 
days later, Galbraith and Charles Redman, Clinton’s special envoy to the region, told 
Tudjman they had ‘no instructions’ from Washington, meaning that the Clinton 
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administration did not object to the deal.”136 Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the 
United States government gave Tuđman tacit approval to move in Krajina.  
The operation in Krajina was quick and decisive. Croatia at this time was 
“ethnically clean.” Furthermore, NATO commenced a campaign in BiH and forced the 
Bosnian Serbs to negotiate a peace settlement. At this point, Milošević appears to have lost 
control of the Bosnian Serbs. The New York Times reported that in May 1993 he failed to 
influence the Bosnian Serbs to sign a peace agreement. At this time, Serbs controlled a 
significant portion of BiH and a quarter of the territory of Croatia. Bosnian Serbs defied 
Milošević and risked confrontation with the United States.137 After NATO attacks against 
the Bosnian Serbs, they turned to Milošević for help. He provided it under the condition 
that he would have authority to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. That paved the 
road to Dayton, Ohio, for a peace negotiation involving Milošević, Tuđman, and BiH 
President Alija Izetbegovic, among others.  
The Bosnia conflict concluded with the Dayton Peace Agreement. The signatories 
of the agreement confirmed who was responsible for the Yugoslav conflict. The agreement 
declared a peace for a war in Bosnia that both Tuđman and Milošević denied being 
involved in. Nevertheless, the conflict stopped with their signatures and those of other 
parties to the Dayton accords.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The Yugoslav political leaders elected in the late 1980s and early 1990s faced 
exceptional circumstances. The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution shifted power from the central 
government to the presidents of the Yugoslav republics. The reforms in the constitution 
were not tested until Tito’s death in 1980. The highest-ranking body of the central 
government was the Yugoslav Council, which consisted of the members appointed by the 
parliaments of the six Yugoslav republics and the two autonomous provinces. Thus, the 
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members’ true commitment was to the persons that appointed them, and in most cases, it 
was the presidents of the republics or the provinces. The presidency of Yugoslavia was 
rotating annually among the members of the Yugoslav Council with the intent that none of 
the republics would establish dominance in the central government. Therefore, after Tito’s 
death, Yugoslavia was governed without an actual executive power. The political vacuum 
in the 1980s created a situation favorable to the emergence of nationalist leaders such as 
Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević.  
ICTY findings charged both men with leading criminal enterprises that were 
responsible for the atrocities in the Yugoslav Civil War. Holbrooke wrote that the Yugoslav 
tragedy “was a product of bad, even criminal, political leaders who encouraged ethnic 
confrontation for personal, political, and fanatical gain.”138 The suffering of the Yugoslav 
people in the 1990s could not be easily repaired. Friction between Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosniaks persists and will continue in the foreseeable future, especially in BiH, where the 
territory is divided between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks. As with the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in its last phases, the chair of the BiH presidency rotates among 
them. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) in this thesis concentrated on examining the Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian 
positions. The positions of the other former Yugoslav ethnicities were excluded for various 
reasons. The intentions of the Montenegrins in the Yugoslav crisis were closely associated 
with those of the Serbs. It would be hard to regard their position on the federation’s breakup 
as distinct from that of the Serbs. The involvement of Macedonia and BiH in the events 
that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s and led to Yugoslavia’s dissolution and 
the civil war was arguably negligible. U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann wrote that 
Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov and BiH President Alija Izetbegovic expressed 
genuine support for Yugoslav unity.139 However, with the secession of Slovenia and 
Croatia and the frightful acts of the Serbs, it was expected that Macedonia and BiH would 
seek independence. Bosnian citizens arguably suffered more than citizens of other SFRY 
republics in the years immediately after the breakup in 1991. Knowing that with secession 
a civil war was inevitable, the Bosnians supported unity.140 The population of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was comprised of almost equal numbers of Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.141 
Despite the fact that the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo add considerable variety in the region, 
they did not make a major contribution to the crises in the early 1990s, mostly because they 
were subjugated by the Serbs. The major havoc in Kosovo (notably in 1998–1999) took 
place after the Yugoslav breakup in the early 1990s. This thesis, as noted above, focused 
on analyzing the causes of the initial breakup in the early 1990s. 
This thesis sought to identify evidence about the root causes of Yugoslavia’s violent 
breakup. It evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the most prominent suggested causes 
of the breakup of the SFRY, and drew conclusions regarding the most convincing 
explanations. As noted previously, the frequently discussed potential causes for the 
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breakup include nationalism, ancient hatreds, economics, the Yugoslav political elites, and 
international politics. 
The nationalism argument presented a profound factor among the causes of the 
dissolution. This thesis analyzed the magnitude of Serb, Croat and Slovene nationalism by 
undertaking an historical examination of the events that took place during the existence of 
Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1991. Specifically, this research examined the manifestation of 
nationalism after the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, 
during World War II, and afterwards. Additionally, this thesis analyzed the communist 
regime policies that created obstacles to establishing a strong national identity embraced 
by all the Yugoslav population. After examining the severity of the nationalism in specific 
republics and the weaknesses in the communist regime’s policies, the thesis acknowledged 
the logic and strong evidence of the case for nationalism as a major reason for the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The potent nationalism among the Yugoslav ethnicities (and the 
failure under Tito to establish a Yugoslav national identity) resulted in a compelling case 
for this argument. 
The ancient hatreds argument was important to consider because its prominence in 
the media conveyed a misleading message to the world concerning the causes of the 
Yugoslav civil war. This message was exploited by local politicians to win elections and 
justify their actions. Ethnic hatred was obvious during the conflicts in Krajina—a contested 
region in Croatia—and during the Bosnian War in the early 1990s. The currency of the 
ancient hatred argument among the ethnicities in Yugoslavia proved that this rationale was 
exploited by certain political elites, who misled people domestically to believe that security 
could be found only by supporting nationalistic leaders. Additionally, this argument was 
credited for creating confusion among the citizens of Western nations as to whether the use 
of force to intervene in Yugoslav wars was justifiable.  
The economic argument was based on examining the self-management system and 
the disparity of the economic outputs among the Yugoslav republics. The self-management 
system was the core mechanism in the Yugoslav economic system, and it led to substantial 
economic growth. However, the republics developed economic outputs that differed 
significantly in their proportional effects, with certain republics more prosperous than 
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others. Additionally, this thesis examined the Yugoslav dependence on economic 
assistance from Western nations. Taking into account the strength of the Yugoslav 
economic system, the level of dependence on Western funds, and the economic 
competition among the former Yugoslav republics, the economic factors suggested that 
Croatia and Slovenia had vast motivations and material incentives to secede from 
Yugoslavia. Although it can be argued that Slovenia enjoyed substantial economic growth 
after gaining independence, it took the country a decade to reach the level of prosperity 
that it enjoyed in the late 1980s.142 The rest of the former Yugoslav republics undoubtedly 
did not see equivalent economic benefits. Therefore, while the economic argument could 
not have independently caused the dissolution of Yugoslavia, it probably contributed to the 
breakup to a noteworthy extent.  
The local political elites’ argument was closely tied with the theme of nationalism, 
since the most influential leaders won elections on successful nationalistic campaigns. The 
Yugoslav political elites’ argument analyzed the objectives of the presidents of Serbia, 
Croatia and Slovenia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their political power rose beyond 
that of the central government. Nevertheless, their motives and political aims differed. 
Opinion polls showed that in the middle of the 1990s seventy percent of the population 
favored Yugoslavian unity. However, nationalistic candidates won republic-level elections 
in the early 1990s. The presidents of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia rose in political power, 
and gained popularity among the various ethnicities. The governing system that Yugoslavia 
was built on could not function effectively after Tito’s death. Its weakness was exposed, 
and it was unable to show resilience in dealing with the numerous factors that threatened 
Yugoslav unity. 
The international politics argument brings a potentially persuasive explanation as 
one of the causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but some elements lack hard facts. The 
European Community nations, after debating the legitimacy of the secessions of Slovenia 
and Croatia from Yugoslavia, decided to support the independence of these two Yugoslav 
republics in 1991 prior to conducting any negotiations with the various other Yugoslav 
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republics. There is no proof that all European Community nations wanted Yugoslavia to 
dissolve. However, the different positions of the EC countries in relation to supporting the 
independence of the Yugoslav republics, and the lack of will to act with military forces to 
stop the genocide, created a void that certain Yugoslav political elites were able to exploit. 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia cannot be attributed to one single factor. However, 
the most persuasive arguments to explain the dissolution of Yugoslavia involve the 
Yugoslav political elites. The failed economic policies, nationalism, ancient hatreds, and 
international politics were only tools that certain Yugoslav political elites exploited to 
achieve their objectives. Mihailo Crnobnja, a former Yugoslav Ambassador to the EC, 
wrote that “Tito’s funeral brought together the biggest assembly of world statesmen and 
dignitaries ever known for such an occasion.” World leaders from the Soviet Union 
(Leonid Brezhnev), China (Hua Guofeng), the United States (Walter Mondale), Palestine 
(Yasser Arafat), and many more traveled to Belgrade to pay their respects to the Yugoslav 
giant. Furthermore, within four years of his death half of the population in Yugoslavia 
visited his grave.143 The international recognition that Tito received is a testament for the 
greatness of Yugoslavia under his leadership.  
The Yugoslav political elites that brought about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, with 
the exception of Milan Kučan, are all dead now. None of them reached the level of Tito’s 
domestic and international recognition. According to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, most of them led joint criminal enterprises. Instead of building 
on what Tito achieved in 35 years (1945-1980), they managed to destroy Yugoslavia in 
their pursuit of personal gains.  
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